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Preface 
My interest in patient safety is probably influenced by the fact that my family moved to 
Tanzania in 1969, where my father was a regional representative and administrator for the 
Lutheran World Federations refugee field service. When I was four, I frequently went with 
him on field trips to visit refugee camps, and experienced well organized, safe sites where I 
could play with rabbits bred for cooking, and where Danish friends led agricultural projects 
that helped the refugees to subsist. We left Tanzania in 1974 and later moved to Botswana in 
1978 where my father was the Norwegian consul and administrator of the Norwegian 
development aid programme (NORAD) for four years. As a neighbouring country to the 
apartheid regime of South Africa we had close contact with refugees through the liberation 
movement (ANC) and a cultural organization (MEDU art ensemble). A close friend, the artist 
Thami Mnyele, was killed after we left in a raid by South African commando soldiers.  
I decided to study medicine to learn how social conditions influence people’s health, presuming 
that practicing as a physician would give a better understanding than purely theoretical studies. 
As a medical student I was elected as a representative for the Norwegian Medical Association. 
My aim was to make physician life more family friendly, because I believed that a good work-
life balance would make physicians more empathetic and considerate toward their patients. 
Leading the Student Branch of the Norwegian Medical Association (NMA), and later as a local 
hospital representative and board member of the Junior Doctors Organization (also a branch of 
the NMA) I worked to improve physicians’ work-life conditions, and found it to be related to 
how healthcare is organized. As an internist I learned how malfunctioning hospital 
organizations undermined caretakers’ efforts to take well care of their patients. The lack of 
opportunity for junior doctors to communicate with responsible leaders on how care was 
organized was striking. Regular staff meetings where junior doctors could meet unit or 
department management, to discuss routines and administrative procedures, did not (and still do 
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not) exist, although junior doctors have a crucial role in patient care. After a while I understood 
that this was different for consultants and for nursing staff. They had their own staff meetings 
where junior doctors were not invited.  I reflected that this practice did not acknowledge the 
importance of the information that junior doctors have on how malfunctioning routines and 
administrative procedures inhibit patient care.  
Having been involved in a regional initiative conducting medical chart review on stroke 
patients, I was appointed a member of the new Patient Safety Committee of the NMA in 2005. 
The Patient Safety Committee (PSC) was a follow up after the quality improvement committee 
had been laid down, and new ones had been established within each speciality branch. The 
NMA wanted to promote the delivery of safe healthcare across specialities. The Patient Safety 
Committee was given the mandate to advise the NMA board on issues concerning patient 
safety. In December 2006 I was appointed as chairperson of the committee. I was then asked to 
make a patient safety strategy, which the NMA board adopted in 2007. It later asked us to make 
an action plan, which they adopted in 2008. 
The PSC represents the NMA in national initiatives made by the National Unit for Patient 
Safety, which was established in the spring of 2007 at the National Knowledge Centre for 
Healthcare.  In planning its strategy the National Unit for Patient Safety gathered a coalition of 
healthcare authorities, labour organizations (including the PSC), and patient organizations to 
several roundtable conferences, where strategies for patient safety improvement work in 
Norway was discussed. The Norwegian System of Compensation to Patients (NPE) took the 
initiative to organize a National Patient Safety conference in 2007, before the National Unit for 
Patient Safety was established. As soon as it was operative the National Unit for Patient Safety 
proceeded to organize the first Norwegian Patient Safety conference in 2008. The conference 
was planned in cooperation with healthcare authorities, the NPE, labour organizations 
(including the NMA), and patient organizations. Another conference was held in 2009. The 
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National Unit for Patient safety has also initiated several working groups, which I have 
participated in on behalf of the PSC. The two working groups I participated in were concerned 
with a national campaign for patient safety and patient safety indicators. In 2009 the Norwegian 
Alliance for Patient Safety was established, linking organizations representing health care 
workers and patients. Its purpose is to increase the priority of patient safety. The National unit 
for patient safety has a secretary function for the Alliance. I represent the NMA in the Alliance.  
As a member of the PSC I attended my first patient safety conference in February 2006. It was 
held in Birmingham by the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA). The massive commitment 
at the conference for making healthcare safer was a contrast to the lack of organizational 
support I until then had experienced as a clinical doctor in Norway. At the conference I 
participated at a workshop on patient safety culture where Professor Bryan Sexton of the Johns 
Hopkins Quality and Safety Research Group presented survey results using the Safety Attitudes 
Questionnaire (SAQ). When he showed how staff perceptions of safety culture correlated with 
outcomes, including incidence of venous thromboembolism and postoperative infections, I 
thought this questionnaire would be interesting to translate and validate in Norwegian. He 
concluded that safety culture surveys such as the SAQ facilitate direct communication between 
frontline workers and upper management on how patient safety culture is perceived. This 
resonated well with my experience of lacking possibilities for junior doctors to communicate 
with management on how routines and organizational conditions inhibit safe patient care.  
Back at home, surfing on the internet on a Saturday evening, I found that the Centre for Health 
Services Research at my neighbouring hospital was announcing a grant to validate the SAQ. 
The deadline had expired but I applied online immediately. The day after, I received a phone 
call from the director, Pål Gulbrandsen, and was invited to an interview. 
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As a researcher in patient safety culture I am together with my supervisor part of a national 
network for patient safety research. We also participate in a Nordic network for safety culture 
research in healthcare, of which I coordinate a subgroup studying the relationship between 
safety culture for patients and employee safety. We are also part of an expert group under the 
Nordic Council of Ministers with a mandate to give advice on how patient safety culture 
assessment can be used as an indicator for patient safety. As members of the Nordic expert 
group we have also been invited to be part of an expert group in EUNetPas, which is a project 
funded and supported by the European Commission. One of the aims of EUNetPas is to 
promote a culture of patient safety.  In this expert group we have presented information on our 
experience with the SAQ. 
When starting patient safety research I believed that staying in clinical practice would help me 
to keep a clinical perspective as a researcher. I therefore still practice one day a week as a 
consultant in a multidisciplinary outpatient clinic for rehabilitation of patients that have had a 
brain stroke. Although this study relies heavily on statistical evidence, I have chosen to present 
some examples I have experienced as a healthcare worker. My interest in patient safety has 
been influenced by such experiences. The examples also illustrate the relevance of my findings 
and give room for understanding and interpreting the statistical evidence. 
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Abstract 
Introduction 
Patient safety culture is how management and staff interact in order to protect patients from 
adverse events in healthcare. It includes routines, practices, awareness, attitudes and priorities 
which in a good patient safety culture make the likelihood for adverse events as small as 
possible. This thesis addresses how patient safety culture in a Norwegian hospital can be 
measured by mapping staff perceptions with the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ). 
Among the first reports to create international interest in patient safety was the 1991 Harvard 
Medical Practice Study. 30,121 randomly selected records were reviewed from 51 randomly 
selected acute care, non-psychiatric hospitals in New York State in 1984 (1). The results 
showed a substantial amount of injury to patients from medical mismanagement or iatrogenic 
harm. Patient safety was brought to the forefront of public debate worldwide, by the 1999 
Institute of Medicine publication, “To Err is Human,” which estimated that each year more 
Americans die from medical errors than from traffic accidents or cancer mammae (2). This 
landmark report called for a more system-oriented approach in dealing with errors in healthcare 
and has resulted in increased research on how circumstances in which errors occur can be 
prevented. Another landmark report prepared for the British government, “An organization 
with a memory,” emphasized how the mindset, values and priorities of employees and 
management influence patient safety. It acknowledged that experiences of adverse events must 
be valued as sources of information necessary for health care organizations to learn and 
improve, but that such learning processes are obstructed by cultures in the healthcare 
organizations that prevent staff from being open about adverse events (3). In two recent reports 
the World Health Organization (WHO) has called for rigorous studies on how the cultures of 
health care organizations influence patient safety (4;5). 
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Research aims  
In this thesis we have examined the psychometric properties of the Norwegian translation of the 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ), at what hospital level safety culture problems are most 
prevalent and if safety climate assessments of frontline staff are different from those of their 
superiors. Implications for the improvement of patient safety culture are discussed. 
Methods  
We collected data from 47 care giving units in one Norwegian university hospital from October 
to December 2006. 1,306 care givers, including physicians and nurses, completed and returned 
questionnaires at a response rate of 68%. A confirmatory factor analysis was done to assess 
whether the Norwegian data adequately fitted a factor structure published for benchmarking 
purposes on data from the US, the UK and New Zealand. A multilevel analysis was done to 
find how the Norwegian questionnaire mapped variance of safety culture by the hospital’s 
hierarchical structure. Finally, an independent sample T-test was done to assess whether safety 
culture perceptions amongst frontline staff differed from those of their superiors. 
Results 
The Norwegian data fit adequately the published factor structure of the benchmarking data 
from the US, the UK and New Zealand. A significant amount of variance in the data was found 
at the organizational level, and especially at the lowest level--the ward level. Frontline staff 
perceived patient safety culture to be significantly worse than their superiors. 
Discussion 
The idea of creating a communication channel from staff to executive leadership with patient 
safety culture surveys inspired this research, as did an expert group under the World Health 
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Organization, which rated patient safety culture as the third most important research topic on 
patient safety in developing countries. 
We chose to translate and validate the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) because, in spite 
of limited external validation, we found it to be the best validated extant questionnaire on 
patient safety culture. The results in the papers show that the factor structure of our translated 
version adequately fits the published factor structure of the SAQ, although it is not perfect.  
They also support existing research evidence, which suggests that patient safety culture exists 
as a phenomenon at several organizational levels, of which most of the variation is found at 
the ward level. The ward level should therefore not be ignored in the pursuit of mapping and 
improving patient safety culture. This implies that an adequate number of staff have to be 
included in the sample in order to analyze the variation at the ward level.  The literature 
suggests including all staff working in the wards. 
We found that charge nurses perceived the patient safety climate to be better than their 
subordinate staff.  Although this may be because they might have a better overview over how 
the ward functions and how adverse events can be prevented, the fact that they are less 
involved in direct clinical care may give a distance to the patients’ and subordinates’ 
experiences of adverse events, their consequences and how they are handled. Executive leaders 
can therefore not rely on reports on patient safety culture from subordinate leaders alone. In 
order to have unfiltered information they need to conduct safety culture surveys on frontline 
staff.   
Conclusion 
The Norwegian translation of the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire maps the patient safety culture 
of hospital wards and departments in a valid and reliable way. A significant part of the patient 
safety culture variation is found at the ward level.  Measurements of patient safety culture 
should therefore include enough staff to be able to break the results down to ward level. 
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Perceptions of safety climate depend on the perceiver’s position in the hospital hierarchy. 
This may cause information on patient safety to be increasingly filtered as it ascends to the 
top levels in the organization. Patient safety culture assessments supplement reports that 
senior managers receive from subordinate leaders.   
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1. Introduction and hypotheses 
Although the risk of harming patients is evident to most caregivers, eliminating or reducing risk 
has not always been the first priority of health care management. Patient safety has been 
regarded primarily as the responsibility of care givers, and therefore as something that 
management could take for granted. This perspective has left caregivers with the blame for 
adverse events without management reflecting critically on how surrounding conditions may 
prevent errors or contribute to them happening. Knowledge of the frequency of adverse events 
in healthcare has in the last decade spurred interest for understanding their causes. This has led 
to studies of staff perceptions regarding the extent they manage to keep patients safe. Results 
show significant variation between care-giving units, predicting variability in safety behaviour 
amongst staff and in patient safety results. The concepts of safety culture and safety climate are 
used to describe this phenomenon. 
Safety culture appeared for the first time as a concept in the scientific literature in 1951 (6). 
After the Chernobyl accident in 1986 it became widely known. The investigation after the 
accident discovered a lack of priority of safety matters at multiple levels in the organization, 
which contributed to the incident. The concept of safety culture was further developed by 
organizational psychologists doing research in the manufacturing industry, and in high 
reliability organizations like nuclear power plants and the aviation industry (7;8). Safety culture 
is described as a construct with dimensions including Teamwork Climate, Safety Climate, 
Management Support for patient safety, Stress Recognition, and Working Conditions (9). 
Safety culture research in healthcare has focused primarily on operating theatres and intensive 
care units (10), but there are also studies from ordinary wards (11;12) and from primary care 
(13;14).  
Studies of the relationship between safety climate measurements and organizational outcomes 
in healthcare, show that the concept can be used to predict outcome. This has led to increased 
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interest in how such measurements can help organizations improve their safety performance 
(11;12;15;16). Efforts to measure safety climate and other dimensions relevant to 
organizational performance and clinical quality have led to the development of a number of 
instruments. It is important to ensure that their measures are reliable, valid and accurate (7).  
This thesis presents an overview of how patient safety has been studied worldwide, suggesting 
that patient culture surveys is a sound approach for patient safety improvement. To facilitate 
further research and application of tools for addressing patient safety culture, we have checked 
the psychometric properties of the Norwegian translation of the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire 
(SAQ) and studied how the questionnaire’s results vary according to the hospitals hierarchic 
structure and according to responders position in the hierarchy (17).  
 
Our first hypothesis is: The published factor structure for Safety Attitudes Questionnaire 
benchmarking data from the US, the UK and New Zealand also fits the Norwegian data 
adequately.  
We tested the first hypothesis by doing a confirmatory factor analysis. The test is further 
described in chapter 6.1. and in the second article. 
 
Our second hypothesis is: Patient safety culture scores mapped by the Norwegian questionnaire 
vary by ward and department, but more across wards than across departments.  
This hypothesis was tested with a multi level analysis; in order to find out at what hospital level 
safety culture problems are most prevalent, for understanding better where to direct 
improvement efforts. The test is further described in chapter 6.4. and in the third article. 
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Our third and last hypothesis is: Perceptions of safety climate amongst employees follow a 
hierarchical pattern and are more positive the further away from the patients the employees 
work.  
We tested this hypothesis with independent samples T-test. If our results supported the 
hypothesis it would indicate that top management receive filtered information on safety climate 
from their subordinate leaders. This would mean that safety climate assessments of frontline 
staff perceptions provide a supplementary unfiltered source of information about the safety 
climate in the care-giving units, and thus are worth doing. Further description of the testing of 
this hypothesis is described in chapter 6.5. and in the fourth article. 
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2. Patient safety – as public concern and science  
Public concern for patient safety has grown. We will now take a closer look at how it has 
developed to become a global issue over the past decade, and see how the nature of adverse 
events and measures to reduce organizational risk has been addressed by scientific literature. 
We will see how patient safety culture is a newcomer on the patient safety research agenda 
and how it complements the other approaches. 
For almost two decades major warnings have been raised against unsafe conditions of 
healthcare delivery. Surveys of adverse events in hospital care have shown that the probability 
for a patient to be harmed during an admission in a hospital in a Western country is 10% (18). 
Following the warnings, many nations have adapted policies with the intent to improve the way 
healthcare is managed and organized in order to reduce adverse events. This has demanded a 
mentality change for understanding that patient results in healthcare depend not only on the 
performance of individual clinicians but also on how clinical work is organized and 
coordinated and how routines for communication and cooperation function. The concept of 
patient safety refers to organizing healthcare so that the risk of patient harm is reduced. It 
means making sure that mistakes made by individual healthcare workers do not lead to patient 
harm. The following case shows how a patient at risk experienced harm after being admitted to 
the hospital. A 64 year old woman with severe pneumonia was admitted to the medical ICU 
where I did my specialist training. Because of an implanted mechanical aortic valve she 
depended on careful anticoagulation therapy to prevent blood clots from forming in her heart 
and dispersing to the rest of her body.  Adequate anticoagulation in her case was based on tight 
monitoring of the blood test, INR, to ensure a value between 2.5 and 3.5.  
The pneumonia treatment proceeded well and she was admitted to a regular ward. After some 
days I received a call from the physician at the ward who said she had collapsed and was 
unconscious. Before this she had been doing fine, was on her feet and was due to leave the 
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hospital the day after. The physician was puzzled and did not understand her condition and 
wanted to refer her to the ICU. She came to the ICU in a coma with a condition beyond 
recovery. The INR value explained the situation. Her family said she had been well aware of 
the risks associated with her mechanic aortic valve and the anticoagulation therapy it 
demanded. She had therefore managed her anticoagulation treatment very carefully. In our 
hospital she automatically lost control over her own anticoagulation treatment and we were 
unfortunately not capable to manage it for her. 
Everyone in healthcare has experienced circumstances under which mishaps are more or less 
likely to occur. The idea of safety design by changing and molding circumstances of care 
delivery follows naturally. Poorly designed systems for delivering health care hide latent 
failures that may lie dormant for a long time until some unfortunate health care provider 
happens to release them. In the case mentioned above the woman had been placed in the 
corridor in an overcrowded ward. Although the case was never analyzed for contributing 
causes, lacking competence concerning the risk related to her heart condition, and lack of time 
to communicate with each patient, in which she might have questioned the blood sample results 
herself probably played a part. Another example is when an anesthesiologist moves to observe 
the patient better, and by accident switches off the life-supporting machine because his clothes 
happen to pull the uncollared dipswitch into off-mode, or when long chains of patient 
handovers create communication breakdown, paving the way for adverse events (19).  
The increased awareness of risks related to delivering healthcare has resulted in a call for the 
establishment of routines for reporting, analyzing and learning from adverse events, and 
developing measurements for monitoring results of interventions to reduce patient harm has 
been emphasized. To give this work priority, the necessity of support and active participation 
by local and executive leadership has been highlighted (20;21). 
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2.1 The development of public concern for Patient safety  
 
In order to understand how public concern for patient safety has grown to become a global 
issue we need to study how it started and from where it spread. We begin with the country 
where it was ignited, the Unites States of America. 
 
2.1.1. The movement of healthcare improvement in the United States of America 
The following paragraphs describe how the movement for patient safety improvement in the 
USA started from the meeting of two people and expanded to a national organization that has 
developed theory and strategies for campaigns involving thousands of hospitals.  
In the mid eighties doctors Don Berwick and Paul Batalden met by coincidence at a conference 
in Boston and instantly found that they both  shared a conviction that they could do more for 
their patients by improving the way healthcare was delivered than by practicing on individuals 
only (22). Their meeting in Boston was the beginning of a continuing companionship in this 
pursuit. Today they are both board members of The Institute of Healthcare Improvement, of 
which Don Berwick is also President and CEO. Paul Batalden is the Director of the Centre for 
Leadership and Improvement at The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical 
Practice. 
They inspired each other to explore Deming’s theory on promoting improvement of quality. 
The theory implies constant monitoring processes of healthcare, like how many patients, for 
example, receive recommended treatment for myocardial infarction. This is done by using 
statistical process control charts. The method shows how reliable health care processes are and 
provide a baseline for improvement efforts. It represents a new and different approach from 
only inspecting the outcomes of bad quality health care. They were convinced that promoting 
quality in healthcare through facilitating better healthcare processes could make an important 
impact in healthcare. They arranged courses to spread the theories and methods of 
improvement, but felt more had to be done to give impact to the movement for quality 
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improvement in healthcare. For this purpose they founded a non-profit organization. Together 
with a small group of highly competent and select people, they created The Institute of 
Healthcare Improvement (IHI) in 1991. This independent organization aims to transform and 
improve the quality of healthcare in the United States. The first year IHI invited clinicians, 
quality experts and others who had taken their courses in quality improvement over the years to 
the first National Forum on Quality Improvement in Healthcare. The conference gathered 1600 
delegates in Orlando, Florida for 3 days. Since then the conference has been held annually. 
Today it involves more than 6000 participants.  These conferences have become a driving force 
in healthcare improvement in the US and internationally. About 10% of the participants come 
from other countries.  
To drive implementation of theory into practice the IHI started the Breakthrough Series 
program addressing specific clinical issues, including reducing caesarean section rates, and 
improving management -at-home of congestive heart failure. Their aim was to let experts of 
clinical topics meet experts of clinical practice in order to test and evaluate organizational 
solutions at the front line of patient care. This program extended to Norway, through the 
Deputy Secretary General Hans Asbjørn Holm of the Norwegian Medical Association. The first 
Norwegian project in the Breakthrough Series Program was launched in 1998. It has since been 
implemented across nine different clinical domains, including caesarean section rates, treatment 
of back pain in primary care, use of constraint in psychiatric care, and care in nursing homes. 
The projects have involved a number of institutions on every topic (23).  
In 1991 the Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) published the incidence of adverse events 
based on a review of 30,000 randomly selected medical charts from 51 hospitals in New York 
state. The study directed attention to how human error is an inevitable cause of adverse events 
and lack of quality in healthcare. Through this study and other research, Lucian Leape, a 
pediatric and thoracic surgeon, created awareness over how processes of health care are 
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vulnerable, proposing that success depends less on individual human actions, and more on well 
organized procedures, systems and routines. Although the study did not stimulate change when 
it was published, the data provided the basis for the report “To Err Is Human,” published by the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) in 1999. This report extrapolated the HMPS results to the entire 
American population, with results indicating that flaws in healthcare delivery was one of the 
country’s leading causes of death, costing about 98,000 lives each year. This report made 
instant headlines, worldwide, and Don Berwick and Lucian Leape became the leading 
spokesmen for breaking down the “culture of silence” about human error and adverse events in 
healthcare. 
In December 2004 the IHI launched an ambitious campaign with the goal of saving one 
hundred thousand lives over a period of 18 months by recruiting as many hospitals as possible 
to give greater priority to making health care safe and effective. The strategy was to 
implement the following six interventions: 1) deploy rapid response teams at the first sign of 
patient decline, 2) deliver reliable, evidence-based care for acute myocardial infarction to 
prevent deaths from heart attack, 3) prevent adverse drug events by implementing medication 
reconciliation, 4) prevent central line infections by implementing a series of interdependent, 
scientifically grounded steps called the "Central Line Bundle," 5) prevent surgical site 
infections by reliably delivering the correct perioperative antibiotics at the proper time, and 6) 
prevent ventilator-associated pneumonia by implementing a series of interdependent, 
scientifically grounded steps including the "Ventilator Bundle."  
Although most of the interventions had already been adapted in the policy of major healthcare 
organizations, the systematic implementation was now encouraged by mobilizing a broad 
coalition of partners that created, advised and endorsed the campaign. The impact of the 
campaign was measured by comparing monthly mortality rates during the campaign with the 
mortality in the same months in the previous year. The raw death rate difference was 
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approximately 33,000. Case mix adjustment done by the methods of three different 
organizations yielded a total number of deaths of 89,000.  
Critics have said that the campaign was not supported by adequate evidence to defend the 
resources demanded to implement the interventions (24). Randomized controlled surveys to 
prove the effect of the interventions have been called for. In addition, case-mix adjustment is 
pointed out as an inexact science that would not withstand rigorous scientific review; there 
also are problems of adjusted administrative codings, where hospitals have sought additional 
reimbursements by enhancing their observed-to-expected mortality ratios (24). They claim 
that the IHI has given an impression that the campaign was more scientifically sound than it 
actually was.  
In answering the critics, the IHI states that they have been clear about the scientific 
uncertainty around the estimations of lives saved, but that these claims have not been 
published by the media. They also say that their measurement had no intent of isolating death 
rate reduction resulting from the campaign from that of other initiatives (25).  
The 100K campaign and the IHI changed patient safety culture at a national level in the USA 
by increasing public awareness on the risks associated with modern healthcare and reducing 
public tolerance of unsafe healthcare. This made room for a change in national policy where 
safe healthcare delivery has become a priority. 
 
2.1.2. From Bristol to the Commonwealth 
We will now look at how public awareness of patient safety has developed in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the Commonwealth countries. We will see how the Bristol Scandal has 
had a great impact on public demand for a new approach to patient safety in the UK, which 
spread to Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. In some of these countries national surveys on 
the incidence of adverse events have caused public demand for intervention.  
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General awareness of patient safety issues in Britain began in 1995 with reports on less than 
good pediatric cardiac surgery at the Royal Bristol Infirmary. The case that gained public 
attention involved a child who was scheduled for surgery against the advice of 
anesthesiologists, some surgeons, and the Department of Health. His death led to extensive 
local and national media attention as well as an external inquiry. The inquiry report concluded 
that the service at the Royal Bristol Infirmary was less than adequate and had a much higher 
(most of the time, double) mortality rate for children undergoing open heart surgery than other 
hospitals (26). The Bristol case had a historical impact on the confidence that British patients 
have in their National Health Service (27).The inquiry report presented 200 system-oriented 
suggestions for preventing similar cases from happening in the future.  Public demand led to 
political action through a report called “An organisation with a memory.” In this report an 
expert group led by the Chief Medical Officer recommended the National Health Service 
(NHS) develop a just and fair organizational culture with a pronounced will to learn from 
adverse events and to change routines when indicated. This led the NHS to form the National 
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA), which now coordinates NHS patient safety activities. 
A symposium on patient safety and monitoring in Adelaide in 1987 sparked a new approach 
to patient safety in Australia (28). The symposium found that problems occurring in 
anesthetic practices in Australia should be identified and analyzed so that cost-effective 
preventive methods could be developed to minimize their adverse effects. It led to an incident 
monitoring study in anesthesia that began in 1988. The Australian Commonwealth 
Government provided funding to do incident monitoring on an institutional basis and a pilot 
study was conducted in six tertiary facilities in different Australian states. The release of the 
results from the Quality in Australian Health Care Study in 1995 prompted a strong public 
reaction. As a consequence, the Australian Patient Safety Foundation (APSF) was engaged to 
implement a patient incident reporting and monitoring system for public healthcare in 
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Southern Australia, The Australian Incident Reporting System (AIMS). In 2000 AIMS was 
also introduced to New Zealand.  
In September 2001, The Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada recognized at 
its annual conference the need for a coordinated strategy to improve patient safety for 
Canadians. A national steering committee was established, supported by working groups 
responsible for addressing different aspects of patient safety. In 2002 it proposed an integrated 
national strategy for improving patient safety in Canadian healthcare, which included the 
establishment of a Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI), intended to promote innovative 
solutions and to facilitate collaboration among governments and stakeholders to enhance 
patient safety (29). In 2003 the federal budget announced the provision of 10 million dollars 
annually to support patient safety initiatives, including creating the Canadian Patient Safety 
Institute. The CPSI spreads information on how to improve patient safety through conferences 
and its own website and leads initiatives to improve patient safety through campaigns. It also 
stimulates research on patient safety through annual research competitions. 
In Scotland the Chief Medical Officer announced in March 2007 that hospitals across 
Scotland were to take part in a national programme aimed at improving patient safety. The 
Scottish Patient Safety Alliance was established to oversee the Scottish Patient Safety 
Programme (30). The programme aims to implement intervention strategies well known from 
the IHI campaigns within a timeframe of five years.  
Awareness of the necessity of addressing patient safety spread and reached other countries in 
Europe, including the Netherlands, Belgium, and the Nordic countries. 
 
2.1.3. Patient safety in the Nordic countries 
We will now describe some of the patient safety initiatives made by national authorities in the 
Nordic countries of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. 
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In Denmark the Danish Society for Patient Safety was established in 2002. It was initiated by 
the Danish Medical Association and rapidly became a broad coalition of hospital owners, 
labour unions and patient organizations (31). It immediately became the driving force in 
patient safety improvement work in Denmark by having a large impact on shaping Danish 
Law on Patient Safety, especially regarding the protection of whistle blowers who report 
adverse events. In 2007 it launched the campaign, ”Operation Life,” which was based on 
overlapping interventions with the 100K campaign. The campaign has contributed to an 
increased awareness of the problems with patient safety in Denmark and coached a large 
number of healthcare workers to lead and evaluate improvement efforts in healthcare (32). 
The campaign in Denmark has been an inspiration to healthcare improvements in the other 
Nordic countries. 
In Sweden, Jonkøping county has since 1998 engaged in quality improvement in healthcare 
under Göran Hendrik’s leadership of the Qulturum, the county’s centre for quality, leadership 
and management. The centre has spread improvement knowledge to an international audience 
by organizing annual Microsystems festivals. From here, improvement knowledge has 
branched and spread now, actively supported by the national Swedish health authorities. 
The Norwegian Medical Association has initiated healthcare improvement projects through 
the Breakthrough Series Program since 1998. The effort has been welcomed, but not actively 
funded, by government. The National Unit for Patient Safety was established in 2007 with 5 
employees. In 2008 the first national conference on patient safety was organized in Oslo. It 
was fully booked and had 400 participants, and has just been repeated in 2009. In 2009 the 
Norwegian government launched a reform, ”Samhandlingsreformen,” with the purpose of 
improving coordination of patient services between hospitals and primary health care givers. 
Based on the experiences from Denmark and the USA, the Norwegian Department of Health 
has decided to launch a patient safety campaign for Norwegian healthcare in 2010.  
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2.1.4 Global initiatives for Patient safety 
The next paragraphs describe the steps the World Health Organization has taken to improve 
patient safety worldwide. 
In 2002 the 55th World Health Assembly passed a resolution urging member states to “pay the 
closest possible attention to the problem of patient safety; to establish and strengthen science-
based systems necessary for improving patients’ safety and the quality of health care, 
including the monitoring of drugs, medical equipment and technology.” The resolution also 
requested the WHO Director-General in the context of a quality programme” to support the 
efforts of Member States to promote a culture of safety within health care organizations and to 
develop mechanisms; for example, through accreditation or other means, in accordance with 
national conditions and requirements, to recognize the characteristics of health care providers 
that offer a benchmark for excellence in patient safety internationally.” 
In accordance with this resolution, in 2004 the WHO established a Global Initiative for 
Patient Safety. The initiative comprises projects on cleaner care, safer surgery, reporting and 
learning from adverse events, and patient safety research. Research on the intervention project 
for safe surgery has attained remarkable results showing that the use of checklists in 
association with surgery may reduce mortality rates by 40% (33). A 2009 WHO report 
presents prioritized lists for research topics on patient safety. They have been made according 
to whether countries are developing, transitional or developed (5).  
 
2.2 Patient safety research, concept, topics and priorities 
So far we have seen how the issue of patient safety has gathered public interest. We will now 
look at how this has motivated patient safety research on how causes of adverse events and 
organizational risk may be identified and on how incidences of patient harm can be 
monitored.  
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Research on patient safety takes into account the context in which errors happen and seeks out 
actions that can prevent the errors from repeating themselves. Improvement of system design 
demands a non-punitive approach to errors and near misses. The underlying idea is that errors 
are system-driven. How does one eliminate the risk of cars crashing with trains? Not by 
warning drivers to look more carefully and punishing them more harshly for having been 
careless, but by building road bridges.  
Since the year 2000 patient safety research has expanded rapidly. A March 2008 PubMed 
search for articles containing the words “patient safety” in five 5-year periods from 1983 to 
2007 returns these numbers: 74, 153, 278, 962 and 3631. Specifically designated scientific 
journals have been established: Quality and Safety in Healthcare (established in 1992 as 
Quality in Healthcare; name updated in 2002), Journal of Patient Safety, Patient Safety and 
Quality Healthcare, and International Journal for Quality in Health Care. 
Patient safety research is conducted along several lines and a number of tools have been 
developed for helping care-giving units prevent harm from happening to their patients.  
Methods for scrutinizing clinical processes and predicting risk in the interaction between 
patients, providers and technology have been adapted from other industries.  
 
2.2.1. Failure modes and effect analysis and Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA) identifies the potential effects of individual 
failures within an organized unit (34). It takes into account both the likelihood and the 
severity of a failure, identifies risks of harm and prioritizes preventive measures. To analyze 
what may go wrong in, for example, the process of delivering medicine by infusion, one 
characterizes each step in the infusion process and identifies how failures can happen in each 
step. Every step in the process is scored on a scale from 1 to 10, for the severity of failure if it 
is not detected, the likelihood of occurrence (based on experience, measurement, literature) 
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and the likelihood that the failure will not be detected before it causes harm (34).  The aim of 
FMAE is to reduce the probability of failure to an acceptable level or to add safety 
mechanisms to mitigate the effects of failure (35).  
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) investigates and models all combinations of process 
failures that may lead up to an imagined, undesired outcome (35;36). Events that contribute to 
adverse outcomes are analyzed through the use of event trees and fault trees. “Event Trees” 
map out the different pathways by which bad events can happen. The tree structure enables 
the analyst to see how one unwanted event leads to another. To include all potential pathways 
of failure the analysis depends on experience from experts from the context of the event one 
wants to mitigate. The graphic design helps the analysts to examine potential solutions 
effectively. Through “Fault Tree Analysis” the likelihood of event occurrence is determined. 
A fault tree resembles an event tree, but opens for adding probabilities of events that lead to 
an adverse event. Probabilistic Risk Assessment leads the analyst to areas of a system that 
may have safety related issues and indicates where to allocate resources for improvement. A 
realistic PRA model includes the variability of human behavior (36). 
 
2.2.2. Root Cause Analysis  
A retrospective method for analyzing causes of adverse events is Root Cause Analysis (RCA). 
The method assigns a team of clinicians, managers, and technicians to answer the following 
three questions: what happened, why did it happen, and what can be done to prevent it in the 
future? The method digs into the causes of adverse events and doesn’t accept as causes 
“violation of procedure” or “patient behavior,” but asks for the preceding causes. RCA relies 
on investigator experience and is best done by staff that is familiar with the scrutinized 
clinical issues. The search for system failure is often limited to one organizational level 
instead of across organizational levels. It tends to look for one single failure (the cause) rather 
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than a combination of failures, which has been a point of criticism. That is because an adverse 
event often is the result of many unfortunate circumstances which the health care provider, for 
several reasons, was not able to mitigate (37). The search for a single failure may inhibit the 
ability to acknowledge the complexity of factors contributing to an adverse event. The 
analysis may, however, lead to a better understanding of the causes of harm to patients and to 
preventive action (36;38). 
 
2.2.3. Reporting adverse events 
For reporting adverse events, the Aviation reporting system has been recognized as a relevant 
model for healthcare. Initially, one thought this routine would identify mechanisms for and 
indicate rate of patient harm. However, a study that compared an incident reporting system to 
medical record review showed that only 5% of harmful incidents were reported in the incident 
reporting system (39). Causes were interpreted to be fear of shame and litigation. Reporting 
systems are now only considered to be information sources for causes of patient harm, and not 
for their rate (40). They also provide the opportunity to accumulate and distribute knowledge 
on rare events so that whole healthcare systems may learn from one incident.  A vulnerable 
point is how results of cause analysis are distributed. An effective infrastructure for 
information distribution is a success criterion. 
Reporting routines make it possible for staff and management to audit significant events and 
identify mechanisms that have contributed to the incident. Informing patients and their 
families that such pitfalls have been removed may provide some consolation (41). Auditing 
significant adverse events may also have a debriefing effect on staff.  
The designer, initiator and manager of the Aviation Safety Reporting System at NASA for 30 
years, Dr Charles Billings, has the following advice to those who plan similar initiatives in 
healthcare: reporting should be confidential so that the informants are protected but may be 
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reached if more information is necessary, the reports should be richly narrated, and, to allow 
descriptions of nuances, analysts should have similar working experiences as those reporting. 
The reports should be collected and analyzed by an organizational body independent of 
management (42).  
A well-functioning reporting system requires a blame free culture where causes of adverse 
events are sought in organizational structures rather than in failing individuals. This does not 
mean that individual responsibility does not matter, but focus should be on measures that can 
prevent disastrous effects from happening all because of one failing individual. 
 
2.2.4. Structured medical record review 
In order to know how safe hospital care is, the rate of adverse events needs to be measured.  
Since staff underreport incidents (39), the need for more reliable sources of data is evident. A 
challenge is to choose measurements that do not exclude patient groups on the basis of 
diagnosis in the way quality registers do, because they may divert the improvement effort 
toward the monitored patient groups on behalf of those that are not monitored. 
The patients’ medical records have until now provided the most reliable source of information 
on adverse events. It is obviously not perfect since this information is often not accounted for 
in the notes. But although care givers may leave out the information on adverse events in the 
notes, they will seldom omit treating the patient. In addition to the notes, the information must 
therefore be found in patient administrative data, lab data and in the information on what 
treatment has been given. The demand for such data has led to procedures for doing a 
structured medical record review (43). It was done in the Harvard Medical Practice Study, and 
has been replicated in its basic outlines in the UK, Australia, Canada and Denmark (1;44-49). 
The Institute of Healthcare Improvement (IHI) developed in 2003 a standardized way of doing 
medical record reviews: the Global Trigger Tool (GTT) (43). Since then, GTT has become a 
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tool that hundreds of hospitals in many countries use to reliably identify and track events 
directly related to patient harm. GTT quantifies and categorizes patient harm and is used to 
evaluate efforts to improve patient safety (50).  The method relies on a review of a 
randomized sample of 20 medical records every month performed by a team of two nurses 
and one physician. The nurses search the sample, independent of each other, to filter out 
records with predefined triggers as displayed in Table 1; for example “INR > 6,”  “Glucose < 
50mmol/l,” or “readmission to ICU.” Records with triggers are further examined to find out if 
harm has occurred. Identified harm is categorized and quantified. 
Table 1 
 Care Module Triggers  Medication Module Triggers 
C1 Transfusion or use of blood products M1 Clostridium difficile  positive stool 
C2 Code /arrest/ rapid response team M2 Partial thromboplastin time greater than 100 
seconds 
C3 Acute dialysis M3 Internationalized Normalized Ratio (INR) greater 
than 6 
C4 Positive blood culture M4 Glucose less than 50 mg/dl 
C5 X-ray or Doppler studies for emboli or DVT M5 Rising BUN od serum creatinine greater than 2 
times baseline 
C6 Decrease of greater than 25% in hemoglobin or 
hematocrit 
M6 Vitamin K administration 
C7 Patient fall M7 Diphenhydramine use 
C8 Pressure ulcers M8 Flumazenil use 
C9 Readmission within 30 days M9 Naloxone use 
C10 Restraint use M10 Antiemetic use 
C11 Healthcare associated infection M11 Oversedation/ hypotension 
C12 In-hospital stroke M12 Abrupt medication stop 
C13 Transfer to higher level of care M13 Other 
C14 Any procedure complication   
C15 Other  Intensive Care Module Triggers 
  I1 Pneumonia onset 
 Surgical Module Triggers I2 Readmission to intensive care 
S1 Return to surgery I3 In-unit procedure 
S2 Change in procedure I4 Intubation/ reintubation 
S3 Admission to intensive care post-op   
S4 Intubation/ reintubation/ BiPap in Post Anesthesia 
Care Unit (PACU) 
 Perinatal Module Triggers 
S5 X-ray intra-op or in PACU P1 Terbutaline use 
S6 Intra-op or post-op death P2 3rd- or 4th-degree lacerations 
S7 Mechanical ventilation greater than  
24 hours post-op 
P3 Platelet count less than 50,000 
S8 Intra-op epinephrine, norepinephrine. Naloxone, or 
romazicon 
P4 Estimated blood loss> 500ml (vaginal) or >1000ml 
(C-section) 
S9 Post-op troponin level greater than  
1.5 ng/ml 
P5 Speciality consult 
S10 Injury repair, or removal of organ P6 Oxytoxic agents 
S11 Any operative complication P7 Instrumented delivery 
 Emergency Department Module Triggers P8 General anesthesia 
E1 Readmission to ED within 48 hours   
E2 Time in ED greater than 6 hours   
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The time needed for the review is seven hours per month for the whole team –three hours per 
nurse and one hour for the physician. A change in the rate of adverse events over time is 
identified by using control charts. The method therefore demands continuity in the reviewing 
team to ensure stability in the way it is performed. The purpose is to enable hospitals, 
departments and clinical units to evaluate their patient safety over time.  
 
2.2.5.  Addressing patient safety culture 
The milestone reports on patient safety acknowledge that making healthcare safer demands a 
change in leaders’ and caregivers’ awareness of adverse events, how they communicate about 
them and how they reflect and act on their causes (2;3;26;51). To be able to learn from 
adverse events, they have to be acknowledged. Acknowledgement of adverse events rests on a 
blame free atmosphere in the organization and its subgroups. A blame free atmosphere 
depends on leaders who are able and willing to analyze the extent to which incidents are 
system driven, and address system causes. The way leaders react to and reflect on adverse 
events must also be visible and predictable to staff. High staff turnover and low degrees of 
interaction between staff and leaders undermine this, because staff and leaders do not have the 
opportunity to learn about each others’ values, priorities and attitudes. 
Molding staff and leadership perceptions on adverse events involve what we call patient 
safety culture. The concept refers to individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies, and patterns of behaviour that specifically determine an organization’s 
commitment to and management of safety (52). 
On a 2009 WHO list over the top five prioritized patient safety research topics, presented for 
each country category, patient safety culture is ranked as number three, in Table 2. 
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Table 2    WHO list of the top five prioritized patient safety research topics 
Developing countries Transitional countries Developed countries 
Rank Research priority   Research priority   Research priority   
1 Identification, development, 
and testing of locally 
effective and affordable 
solutions 
 Identification, development, 
and testing of locally 
effective and affordable 
solutions 
 Lack of 
communication and 
coordination  
 
2 Cost effectiveness of risk 
reducing strategies 
 Cost effectiveness of risk 
reducing strategies 
 Latent organisational 
failures 
 
3 Counterfeit and substandard 
drugs 
 Lack of appropriate 
knowledge and transfer of 
knowledge 
 Poor safety culture 
and blame oriented 
processes 
 
4 Inadequate competences, 
training, and skills 
 Inadequate competences, 
training, and skills 
 Cost effectiveness of 
risk reducing 
strategies 
 
5 Maternal and newborn care  Lack of communication and 
coordination  
 Developing better 
safety indicators 
 
 
Reproduced from [Global priorities for patient safety research, David W Bates, Itziar Larizgoitia, Nittita Prasopa-Plaizier et 
al. 338, 1242-44, Copyright © 2009]  with permission from BMJ Publishing Group Ltd. 
Mainstream research on patient safety culture builds on methods developed by organizational 
psychologists, mapping organizational values through questionnaires that assess perceptions 
of staff. Research from other industries show that staff perceptions on safety culture predict 
their safety behavior and incidences of unsafe events (12;53). Safety behavior that prevents 
harm needs to be continually requested and rewarded by leadership in order to be maintained 
(54). In this way, leadership can promote a good safety culture. Recent evidence indicates that 
this also applies to healthcare. Staff perceptions improve when leaders attend to patient safety 
culture (15).  
Questionnaires that measure staff perceptions reflect only limited aspects of patient safety 
culture. Interesting aspects of how professions misinterpret each other’s attitudes, behavior 
and priorities are not easily explored with these kinds of questionnaires. However, valid and 
reliable questionnaires make measurements of staff perceptions on patient safety available to 
top management. The information may be used to guide interventions. These may use a  
qualitative approach to explore further the causes of staff perceptions (55) in order to improve 
the patient safety culture.  
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3.  Patient safety culture, concept and influences 
Until now we have studied the development of a public concern for patient safety, how 
research in the field has evolved, and how the topic of patient safety culture research is a 
latecomer in this research. We will now explore how the theory of organizational culture and 
its concept of safety climate are foundations for patient safety culture research. We will study 
how safety climate can be applied to the context of healthcare and how it relates to teamwork 
and leadership. 
 
3.1. Organizational culture – concept and influences 
These paragraphs present the theoretical approach to organizational culture that is used in this 
thesis. A description of how the concept of organizational culture developed historically is 
included. How organizational culture is influenced by professional and national cultures, 
political context, and structural change in the organization is discussed. 
Culture is the collective programming of minds which distinguishes members of one group in 
society from another (56). Such groups may be families, school classes, working groups, and 
organizations. The programmes are transferred from parents to children, from teachers to 
students and from leaders to subordinates as patterns of thinking about the world and their 
role in it.  It is reflected in how the individuals evaluate and judge their own performances and 
those of others; in terms of being true or false, good or evil, beautiful or ugly. The culture 
determines how the individuals in the group interpret and give meaning to their experiences.  
Organizational culture developed as a concept after the rise of Japan as a leading industrial 
power in the 1960’s. Theorists believe that the ability to transform an industrial empire out of 
the ashes of the Second World War with no natural resources, no energy, and a large 
population in a crowded space is related to Japanese culture and general way of life. The 
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cultural values of the rice fields consist of relentless solidarity where one person’s efforts are 
harvested by another and where all individuals are mutually interdependent in order to 
achieve an adequate result against all odds. The spirit of the samurai represents the individual 
that protects the workers from danger and coordinates the worker’s efforts in a strategic and 
meaningful way (57). A recognized theory is that Japan’s manufacturing organizations 
combine the cultural values of the rice fields with the spirit of the samurai to create an 
organizational culture that is particularly conducive to high quality mass production. 
The concept of organizational culture relates to the lessons that members of an organization 
learn as they solve the organizations problems of survival, adaptation to an external 
environment, and of internal integration, over time (57). When, for example, a CEO prepares 
staff for moving into a newly built hospital at the same time as the organizational structure is 
radically changed, and says it will be like going on a bus ride, and “those who are not 
comfortable on the bus can just get off.”  The metaphor may perhaps be intended to tell the 
organization that the change could be an interesting experience but it also may be interpreted 
by employees to mean that those who want to speak up about problems with the process 
should rather leave their job.  
Organizational culture is considered to consist of at least two layers. The visible outer layer 
manifests itself with observable behaviors, uniforms, meeting routines, reporting and greeting 
rituals. The inner layer consists of the values, perceptions, beliefs and underlying assumptions 
that provide references for members of an organization to interpret the behavior of others and 
to guide their own (58;59).  
Behavioral rituals may be related to a dress code, choice of language and how one is expected 
to act in different situations. They determine how meetings are conducted, how budgets and 
plans are specified, how reports are issued and how experts are nominated. Sometimes the 
rituals better serve the purpose of symbolizing how power in a group is distributed rather than 
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the purpose of sound decision making (56). An example is the ritual for seating, which a 
resident experienced at the morning report meetings in an Anesthetic department.  In the 
middle of the room there was a table where less than half the chairs were occupied. Along the 
walls were chairs that were all occupied. People preferred to stand along the walls rather than 
sit on the empty chairs at the table. The ritual did not serve the purpose of making people sit 
comfortably, but probably reflected how power and influence was distributed in the group. 
Leaders provide the basis on which group members model their culture by articulating beliefs, 
values and assumptions (59). The patterns of perceiving, thinking, feeling and behaving in the 
group provide meaning and stability, undermining anxiety from not being able to understand or 
predict events happening around the group. Because they provide emotional stability to their 
members, organizational cultures are difficult to change. An exception is when critical events 
occur. They provide unique opportunities to change an organizational culture in a short time. 
Leadership sets the standard for how the group finds it legitimate to react. If, for example, the 
leader immediately seeks to blame someone rather than to analyze the causes of the incident in 
a systematic way, the group learns that this is how they can expect their leader to react when 
such a crisis occurs. Norms and beliefs also arise around how the members in a group respond. 
Articulate group members, and those considered as role models may also have a significant 
impact on the group’s culture. Union organizations and other professional and social networks 
of people within the organization contribute with their values and attitudes and represent 
subcultures within the organizational culture.  
Because development of organizational cultures depends on shared experiences, one will find 
that large organizations; for example, hospitals, often have stronger organizational cultures at 
the subgroup level than at the hospital level (59). That may be because experiences at the 
group level are more easily shared than at the hospital level, which involves more people. One 
will also see that merging, a common experience to Norwegian hospitals, challenges 
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organizational cultures. Conflicts may arise if the values and assumptions of the merging 
cultures are not addressed in the process. A strong and supportive culture may be undermined 
by traumatic experiences that lead to distrust and disloyalty, which with time become 
unspoken assumptions. Healing wounds after traumatic experiences may be done by letting 
motivated insiders articulate underlying assumptions so that misunderstandings and conflicts 
are brought to the surface and can be addressed (59).  
Organizational culture in public healthcare is also influenced by national policies that make 
up the organizations’ financial and administrative systems. Values of these systems guide 
employee’s behavior. An example is how the activity-based financing system in Norwegian 
public hospitals gives compensation for harmful iatrogenic incidents like fractures and 
infections occurring while patients are hospitalized. It does not provide incentives for 
leadership to reduce patient harm. 
Organizational cultures are influenced by the national cultures of their members (58). Data 
from Taiwanese pilots who had filled out the Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire 
(58) did not replicate the original factor structure, and items did not correlate as expected. 
Team trainers for pilots experienced that the concept of Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
seemed to make more sense in some countries and airlines than in others. This led researchers 
to explore further the impact national culture has on organizational culture in aviation. 
National cultures are influenced by restraints on resources and infrastructure, as well as history 
and different religious references. How national cultures differ is complex. By cross country 
research Hofstede has been able to detect some cultural elements that affect behavior in work.  
These are sorted into four cultural indexes (56). The Individualism versus Collectivism index 
indicates to what extent a national culture prefers a loose social framework giving a high 
degree of individual autonomy, compared to a tighter social framework demanding a higher 
degree of loyalty from the individuals but also higher promises of loyalty and care-giving in 
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return.  In national cultures with low scores on this scale, disagreement is seldom directly 
expressed and tends to have a refined language of body and facial mimic. This has 
consequences for organizations that depend on subordinates to give direct communication and 
feedback. The Power Distance index indicates to what extent members of a society accept that 
power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally. The Uncertainty Avoidance 
index relates to the emotional meaning of rules and reflects degrees of tolerance for uncertainty 
about the future. Strong Uncertainty Avoidance index societies demand high levels of control, 
rigid codes of belief and behavior, and are intolerant toward deviant persons and ideas. The 
Masculinity versus Femininity index shows a culture’s preference for values like achievement, 
heroism, assertiveness and material success, on the masculine side , and on the feminine side, 
preference for relationships, modesty, caring for the weak, and quality of life.  
Norwegian healthcare employs immigrant healthcare workers with a variety of national 
backgrounds. One should therefore assume that this influences how openly employees 
communicate with leadership when patient safety is at stake. When organizations adapt 
internationally recommended procedures and strategies they must be translated to a level of 
formalization and standardization acceptable to the national norms of the organizations’ 
employees. That is why it is so important to validate translated questionnaires intended to, for 
example, measure patient safety culture.  
The Power Distance (PD) scores also vary according to social status and educational level. 
Those with the highest levels of education and social status have the lowest PD scores. In a 
study on surgical teams in Switzerland, which is a low PD country, surgeons perceived the 
lowest power distance in their work relationships, followed by anesthesiologists, while the 
surgical and anesthesia nurses perceived a significantly higher level of power distance (58).  
Professional cultures contribute to safety by emphasizing responsible safety behavior and 
dedication to executing one’s job effectively. On the other hand, a sense of invulnerability may 
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follow a professional culture, making pilots and physicians less aware of personal limitations 
and the need for training and safety precautions.  
 
3.2. Safety culture – bridging leadership and safety behavior  
As a branch of organizational culture, safety culture refers to individual and group values, 
attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that  specifically determine the 
organization’s commitment to and management of safety (52). The methodology for research 
on safety culture has been developed in the tradition of organizational psychology research 
and has mainly been performed in the manufacturing and high reliability industry. In this 
research, organizational culture is described by qualitative methods as well as expressed 
through quantitative surveys (6). Quantitative surveys have concentrated on measuring staff 
perceptions, which are referred to as organizational climates. Organizational climates are 
mathematical expressions of how members in natural social units perceive that cultural norms 
are enacted by leadership and members in the unit. If staff perceptions vary a lot, the mean 
value will give a less precise description of the climate in a unit, compared to where they are 
similar.  Organizational climates are therefore measured both according to level of mean and 
the degree to which staff share the perceptions (60). The degree to which staff share the 
perceptions in the unit is a validity criterion for such measurements and is called the 
organizational climate strength. Organizational climates with diverging perceptions amongst 
staff are regarded as weak with limited power to predict staff practices (12). The mean of the 
staffs’ climate perceptions in the unit is called the climate level.  
Measurements of safety climate with the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire are often presented in 
terms of the percentage of staff that reports a good safety climate. This procedure provides 
information on both climate level and strength (16) . When safety culture is measured using 
questionnaires, the items are sorted into scales reflecting an array of organizational 
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dimensions relevant to safety, such as working conditions, teamwork climate and safety 
climate.  
Safety climate is the extent to which employees perceive that safety is important to the 
organization (61). Zohar has shown that safety climate in operational units is influenced by 
safety priorities at organizational levels. In the high risk manufacturing industry, working 
units with a good safety climate had fewer safety mishaps and fewer absences from work. 
Safety climate at the top of the organization influenced safety behavior at the group level 
mediated by the safety climate at the group level. The degree to which tasks were formalized 
through procedures that limited individual assessment added to this influence (62). Measuring 
safety-oriented supervisory activity by repeated interviews with subordinates, and feeding the 
information back to the supervisors increased safety oriented interaction between supervisors 
and subordinates: Subordinate safety behavior and safety climate scores improved and minor 
injury rates were reduced (63).  
In high risk units supervisors are likely to implement more rigorous safety procedures, and 
motivate more strongly for safety behavior than supervisors in units with lower risk. If safety 
procedures are not rigorously practiced in high risk units they will have lower group climate 
scores than the units with lower risk (64). This is reflected in the levels of patient safety 
culture in our study, which tended to be higher in wards and departments with lower risk (e.g., 
Neurology department, Medical department) compared to those with higher risk (e.g., the ER, 
and the Operation department).  
Regardless of risk level, supervisors are likely to execute instituted procedures according to 
their own bias. Some supervisors will expect subordinates to assume greater responsibility for 
safety and emphasize this in their supervision; others will accept less responsible behavior 
from the subordinates. This explains the large variation in climate scores at the group level, 
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which is the background for our second hypothesis, where we assume that patient safety 
culture vary by ward and department and but more across wards than across departments. 
Individual differences also characterizes managers in higher hierarchical positions (64).   
Since organizational culture is influenced by leadership, it is relevant to consider the 
significance of different leadership qualities. Leadership quality may be categorized in a broad 
range of dimensions.  Transformational leadership is value based and emphasizes 
individualized interaction, commitment and bonding between leaders and subordinates for the 
purpose of reaching challenging goals (64). When management at higher levels gives safety 
low priority, transformational leadership at the supervisory level is positively related to safety 
climate for employees. This may reflect both how transformational leaders in the 
manufacturing industry consider employee safety a moral obligation, even when it is not a 
declared priority by management. It can also indicate that interaction between leaders and staff 
facilitates sharing of values and priorities and produces a desired pattern of behavior.  
Transactional leadership is concerned with organizing tasks for reliable performance. The 
category is subdivided into the following three dimensions: constructive, corrective and laissez 
faire. Constructive leadership is less individualized than transformational, but still emphasizes 
subordinates’ individual performance results, but with less weight on personal interaction. 
Constructive leaders only make a positive difference when safety has high priority from higher 
management levels (65). They are not driven by a personal connection to employees like 
transformational leaders are, and will give safety a priority only if it is demanded by senior 
management.  
Corrective leadership is non individual, only identifying with the priorities of superior leaders. 
Corrective supervisors might even disregard imminent danger in favour of reaching production 
targets. This element of leadership is addressed in the following SAQ items: “Unit management 
doesn't knowingly compromise patient safety,” where 49% of the total respondents in our 
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survey agreed and “Hospital management doesn't knowingly compromise patient safety,” 
where only 27% agreed (66). Less than half of the staff believed that leadership would not 
knowingly compromise patient safety, indicating an element of corrective leadership.  
We will now interpret how junior physicians in our study perceived safety climate, in the 
context of leadership. As the table shows, the junior physicians perceived safety climate to be 
significantly worse than nurses, charge nurses and senior physicians (Table 3).  
Table 3. Variation in mean perceptions amongst staff for Safety Climate 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
Score on 
factor 
scale 
 
 
Charge 
nurses  
 
 
Nurses  
 
Senior  
Physicians 
 
 
 
Safety Climate 
 
Charge nurses (n 49)   
Nurses (n 623) 
Senior physicians (n132) 
Junior physicians (n 147) 
 
 
69.0 
58.6 
63.2 
53.8 
p 
 
0.008 
0.158 
0.000 
p 
 
 
0.068 
0.041 
p 
 
 
 
0.001 
 
Reasons for this may be that most junior physicians in Norwegian hospitals have little formal 
security of employment. Their time limited employment is regulated by law, in order to make 
sure that as few as possible stay longer in these assignments than necessary. The aim is to make 
as many physicians as possible get through the specialization programs. Combined with 
temporary assignments, three to six months at a time, junior physicians are seldom free to 
speak up and criticize conditions of patient care. If they do they may risk not having their 
assignment renewed, which would spoil their career and make their social situation difficult. At 
the same time, junior physicians play a crucial role by providing the bulk of patient care in 
hospitals. They admit them, read the reports from the referring physician, and decide what 
diagnostic examinations to perform and what treatment to give. At the end of the hospital 
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admission they write a report to the referring physician. If indicated, they refer the patient to 
another hospital. They are supposed to do this work under the supervision of consultants. In 
reality, the supervision depends on cultural elements like to what extent supervision is 
recognized as important by the leadership, the consultants’ workload, and their attitude toward 
supervision. A trend in Norwegian hospitals for the past two decades has been that fewer 
consultants do rounds on inpatients in medical departments because they are scheduled for 
work in the outpatient departments. This leaves the junior physicians, the least experienced, 
with responsibility for the most sick and vulnerable patients. As previously mentioned, junior 
physicians in many specialties are not invited to meetings where organizational issues are on 
the agenda. This gives them little opportunity to inform leadership about how dysfunctional 
organizational routines and practices cause adverse events to patients. This may contribute to 
the situation we assume in our third hypothesis, that perceptions of safety climate are more 
positive the further away from the patients the employees work. 
Apparently, the lacking opportunities that junior physicians have, to speak up about unsafe 
patient care, is not a Norwegian problem only (67). Based on theory presented in this chapter 
their low perceptions of patient safety climate could possibly be changed if their leaders and 
supervisors addressed the causes of adverse events through dialogue and interaction.  
 
3.3. Cultural influences on patient safety 
We have now considered research from other high reliability and manufacturing industries 
which shows that safety climate measurements to some extent predict safety behaviour and 
safety outcome (53). This relation is not equally well studied in healthcare. There is, however, 
some evidence that claims a connection between safety culture and climate measurements and 
patient outcome.  
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An observational study showed that team leaders that encouraged staff to speak up, and had 
few concerns related to power and status, were more successful in institutionalising minimally 
invasive cardiac surgery than their colleagues elsewhere (68).   
In a study in the United Kingdom (UK), Mannion showed that National Health Services (NHS) 
hospitals with “clan” cultures are less likely to have high star ratings than “developmental” 
cultures. “Clan” cultures are characterized by tradition, loyalty, and coherence with emphasis 
on morale, while the “developmental” cultures are characterized by innovation, 
entrepreneurship, creativity and adaptation (69). Although the star rating system has been 
contested, the study resonates well with the Kennedy report on the public inquiry on children’s 
heart surgery at the The Bristol Royal Infirmary (26).  
The Kennedy report concluded that The Bristol Royal Infirmary was characterized by a “Club” 
culture: “Dr Roylance told his staff: `don't give me your problems, give me your solutions,'”  “a 
system of separate and virtually independent clinical directorates, combined with a powerful 
message that problems were not to be brought to the centre for discussion and resolution, meant 
that there was power but no leadership,” “ the systems and culture in place were such as to 
make open discussion and review more difficult rather than more easy.”  It concludes: “There 
were a number of elements in the system and culture of management in Bristol which were 
conducive to the provision of less than adequate care,” “the inadequacies of management were 
an underlying factor which adversely affected the quality and adequacy of care which children 
received.” The report argues that the pathologic culture was not only a problem at the 
institution level but a problem in the whole NHS: “Trusts were to be allowed to get on with 
things. Senior managers were invited to take control, but little or no system existed to monitor 
what they did in the exercise of that control. Indeed, it did not really exist inside the Trust 
either, as Bristol suggested. The Chair and the Trust Board were either part of the ‘club’ or 
treated as outsiders.” The Kennedy report gives qualitative evidence on cultural characteristics 
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believed to play an important role in paving the ground for adverse events that happened to 
children having heart surgery at the hospital.  
The study by Mannion et al. shows that organizational performance in healthcare is linked to 
organizational culture. Case studies exploring this further found cultural problems related to the 
misalignment between professional values and practices, and changing demands and 
expectations in NHS policy. The high performing NHS acute trusts had robust systems for 
monitoring and improving organizational performance, with an informational infrastructure, 
capacity and performance management architecture to allow power and responsibility to move 
from the apex and toward frontline staff. The low performing acute trusts lacked strong 
directive planning and robust systems for information and performance management. Strong 
and empowered middle managers were found essential for the high performing acute trusts, 
which also paid particular attention to how they recruited, selected, promoted, retired or even 
fired staff. Because the worst cultural problems were experienced by low performing trusts, 
policymakers wanting to improve organizational culture were advised to take these experiences 
into consideration.  
In a study of the relationship between the characteristics of hospitals, nursing units, work 
environments, and organizational and patient outcome, Hofmann found that safety climate in 
working units predicted urinary tract infections and medication errors occurring within the 
three following months. The effect of safety climate on medication errors was stronger when 
dealing with more complex patient conditions (11). Knowing that patients with complex 
conditions benefit even more is promising since they are also more prone to adverse events 
(1;49). The study is based on data from a larger study – the Outcome Research in Nursing 
administration project II. The results give reason to further explore the effect of safety climate 
intervention in healthcare. 
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In another study, two nursing climate scales were developed to measure key aspects of the 
nursing role--patient orientation, professional development and teamwork, all known to have 
impacts on patient safety (12). One scale, The Hospital Nursing Climate Scale, was made to 
measure how policies and practices by senior management supported the dimensions.  The Unit 
Nursing Climate Scale was designed to measure how nurse managers and peers practiced the 
same three dimensions at the unit level. Medication safety was measured with a 12 item 
checklist for routine practices associated with medication storage, expiration dates, post 
administration records, patient identification and bedside administration. Emergency safety was 
measured with three items covering replenishment of medical supplies, updating of records and 
authorization renewals according to emergency procedures. Both hospital climate and unit 
climate levels predicted results in the patient safety data collected six months later. Hospital 
climate and unit climate levels were significantly correlated. There was also a significant 
interaction between the two climates. When both were high, patient safety was at its highest 
level. When hospital climate was low, the effect of unit climate on patient safety practices 
became stronger, indicating that unit level managers can compensate for deficient 
organizational level priority of patient safety (12). The results propose that leadership at senior 
and local levels interact in creating a safety climate that supports or undermines safety 
behaviour at the frontline. A weakness of this study’s design is that it only measures a limited 
number of dimensions of safety culture.  
In applying the concept of patient safety culture in healthcare, questionnaires have been 
developed to measure staff perceptions on dimensions relevant to patient safety. The Safety 
Attitudes Questionnaire, which is used in this thesis, is developed by Bryan Sexton, together 
with Robert Helmreich  (9). The questionnaire maps six dimensions of safety culture related to 
patient care: Safety Climate, Teamwork Climate, Stress Recognition, Perceptions of 
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Management, Working Conditions and Job Satisfaction. In patient care settings safety culture is 
often referred to as patient safety culture.  
Questions asked are, for example, “I am encouraged by my colleagues to report any patient 
safety concerns I may have,” and “I would feel safe being treated as a patient here.” Examples 
questions asked to address how the teamwork climate supports frontline workers are, “The 
physicians and nurses here work together as a well-coordinated team,” and “Disagreements in 
this clinical area are resolved appropriately (i.e., not who is right, but what is best for the 
patient).  
 
3.4. Teamwork climate and patient safety 
We have now seen that organizational cultures influence healthcare outcomes, including patient 
safety. This relationship can be expressed numerically by measuring staff perceptions in 
organizational climates. One example is teamwork climate. In the following paragraphs we will 
explore how teamwork climate is related to patient outcome and is influenced by organizational 
infrastructure. We will introduce the concept of “Microsystems” and “Mesosystems” and look 
at how teamwork climate relates to professional culture and power distance. First, we take a 
look at a relevant case. 
One night a man in his fifties was admitted with hypoxy, circulatory unstableness, no signs of 
ischemia in the ECG, D-dimer was high and there was pleural effusion on the X-ray of the 
lungs. At a recent meeting in the clinic we had discussed and agreed that we should treat 
severe cases of acute pulmonary embolism with thrombolytic therapy. But before doing this 
the diagnosis had to be confirmed with spiral CT. This was agreed on without informing or 
making agreements with the radiology department, which would have to be prepared to do 
this examination around the clock. The radiologists had sleeping duty at home in the night. I 
assessed that this patient should be considered for thrombolytic therapy, but hesitated to 
 49 
contact the radiology department to ask for a spiral CT because I knew I would meet hostile 
comments about this not being according to their procedure. The radiologist on duty was at 
home and would want to come only if it was highly indicated. Having many other tasks 
coming on, it was easy for me to push this uncomfortable problem aside and just order 
standard anticoagulation treatment and think I could sort out the question of thrombolytic 
therapy when I had more time to plan my arguments for requesting the radiologist to do the 
examination. The nurse from the ICU called. He had heard about the discussion in the 
physicians’ meeting and knew about the conclusion ─ to treat severe acute cases of PE with 
thrombolytic therapy ─ and he asked me why I had not ordered it. I told him that I hesitated 
because I thought it would be difficult to get the radiologist to do the Spiral CT at night since 
it was against their usual procedure. He urged me to proceed. I called the radiology 
department and found that the radiologist already was there for a surgical procedure. His 
counter-argument was that this case introduced a new principle to their practice that would 
imply more active duty at night for their department. Although he was reluctant, he accepted 
that the spiral CT was necessary for confirming the diagnosis before we gave thrombolytic 
therapy. The diagnosis was confirmed with spiral CT and the patient was given thrombolytic 
therapy with a successful result. I am glad the nurse urged me to confront the radiologist in 
the middle of the night, but it would have been easier if this question already had been sorted 
out by leaders from the medical and radiology departments.  
The case demonstrates how teamwork is an issue across both boundaries of hospital 
professions, and departments, and that it is highly related to the SAQ’s teamwork climate 
items which are: “Nurse input is well received in this clinical area,” “In this clinical area, it is 
difficult to speak up if I perceive a problem with patient care,” “Disagreements in this clinical 
area are resolved appropriately (i.e., not who is right, but what is best for the patient),” “I have 
the support I need from other personnel to care for patients,” “It is easy for personnel here to 
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ask questions when there is something that they do not understand,” and “The physicians and 
nurses here work together as a well-coordinated team.” The case demonstrates how teamwork 
climate is relevant for patient safety.  
The link between teamwork climate and patient safety outcome was particularly addressed in 
the Keystone project, an intervention to improve safety culture in 99 ICUs in Michigan. First, 
the project measured safety culture with the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire. A broad set of 
interventions were implemented, including tools for teamwork improvement: a daily goals 
sheet, morning briefings and shadowing of other disciplines. The latter means when a person 
from one profession observes a person from a different profession at work. The aim is to learn 
how tasks of the other profession depend on the tasks of the observer’s profession. ICU staff 
were challenged on what they could do to improve teamwork among physicians and nurses. 
At baseline, teamwork climate varied significantly among the ICUs, ranging from 16% to 
92% percent of caregivers reporting good teamwork climate. 17% of the ICUs had a >= 60% 
consensus on good teamwork. After the intervention 46% of the ICUs had a >= 60% 
consensus or a 10 point improvement on good teamwork (70). The intervention also resulted 
in a significant reduction of catheter related blood stream infections (71). The evidence from 
the study indicates that the Safety Attitudes Questionnaires is externally valid. 
When discussing teamwork across boundaries of departments, it is relevant to introduce the 
concepts of “microsystems” and “mesosystems.” A microsystem refers to a group of 
clinicians and of staff working together with a shared purpose to provide care for a population 
of patients (72). A mesosytem is a model which integrates the care delivery process between 
contributing microsystems defining a new mesosystem leadership for each patient population 
(73). The previously mentioned case of the patient with pulmonary embolism shows how 
teamwork is influenced by contracts and agreements at the department level; the radiologist 
was unwilling to do a procedure at night without support from his leadership that this was a 
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valid use of resources. The need for coordination of leadership between departments is 
addressed in the model of mesosystems, which serve specific patient populations, often based 
on diagnosis. Patients with several chronic conditions would probably be more difficult to 
care for in such an organizational structure, if it does not specifically address their potentially 
complex demands. They are more prone to adverse events and need a broad approach that 
includes several specialties, with the capacity to sort out and coordinate the professional 
priorities amongst them. Geriatric units may perhaps be the closest one comes to such an 
organizational structure. Still, one should not forget that not all patients with more than one 
chronic condition are elderly.  The fact that patients with complex conditions are also 
vulnerable to experiencing adverse events (49) is perhaps the reason why “how to improve 
communication and coordination,” is rated highest on WHO’s list over research priorities on 
patient safety (5). As the case of the pulmonary embolism demonstrates (page 48), frontline 
caregivers may find themselves in situations where they have to advocate for the needs of 
their patients. If this advocacy is left to less experienced staff, like, for example, junior 
doctors, with little impact on such ad hoc negotiations, it may threaten patient safety. 
Deciding which patients to prioritize is a frequent scenario in healthcare, where limited 
resources have to be distributed amongst sometimes endless demand. To combat such 
ambiguity it would help if leaders sort out priority problems that may arise, and communicate 
clearly how they should be handled. This demands adequate meeting routines both at the 
leadership level and between leaders and frontline staff. As earlier mentioned, such routines 
are not well implemented in Norway.  
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3.4.1. Perceptions of teamwork across professions 
In the previous paragraphs we have considered how organizational infrastructure and 
leadership priorities influence teamwork climate. We will now examine how perceptions of 
teamwork may differ between professions. 
 A study performed in eight non surgical intensive care units in Houston, Texas examined 
how critical care physicians and nurses perceived teamwork in their working unit (74). 73% 
of the physicians rated the quality of collaboration and communication with the nurses as 
high, while only 33% of the nurses rated the quality of communication and collaboration with 
the physicians as high. Nurses found it more difficult to speak up if they perceived a problem 
with patient care, and their mean scores on perceptions of how “input from ICU nurses about 
patient care was well received in the unit” were significantly lower than those of the 
physicians.  Nurses agreed significantly more (p <= 0.01) than physicians on the item:  
“Decision-making in our ICU should include more input from other ICU personnel than it 
does now.” A simple interpretation of the results is that the two professions have different 
perceptions of what a good teamwork climate is; physicians believe it to be when nurses do as 
they are told. To nurses, a good teamwork climate is that they are asked for information about 
the patient that they believe is relevant for treating them. In our data from Akershus 
University Hospital we found a significant difference between the fractions of physicians and 
nurses that agreed on that collaboration with the other profession was good. 84% of the 
physicians (N=19) rated the collaboration with nurses as good, while only 40% of the nurses 
(N=74) rated the collaboration with physicians as good. Similar results have been found in 
American operating units and in labor and delivery units (75).  
We did not find the same result studying all the somatic care giving units as a whole;  75% of 
the physicians (N=238) rated the collaboration with the nurses as good while 71% of the 
nurses (N=531) rated the collaboration with the physicians as good. We therefore suggest that 
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ICUs may have greater challenges concerning teamwork climate than other somatic wards. 
The reasons may be related to the cultural issue of power distance, as described in the work of 
Hofstede (56). He found that occupations with lower status and educational level have higher 
power distance scores, indicating a higher tolerance for unequal distribution of power in a 
hierarchy, than occupations with high status and educational level (58). In Norway, nurses 
working in ICUs are specialized and therefore on a higher educational level than nurses in 
ordinary wards. This may reduce ICU nurses’ acceptance of unequal distribution of power 
over clinical decision-making in teamwork with physicians, compared to nurses in other 
wards.  
Differences between nurses and physicians perceptions of collaboration with the other 
profession may also be related to their professional cultures, which may give them different 
expectations on how the professions should interact. Such differences could be sorted out by 
facilitating dialogue across the professional boundaries, with for example the Safety culture 
check up tool (55).   
 
3.5. Leadership influences on patient safety culture 
So far we have discussed how the new approach to patient safety research has evolved, how 
patient safety research has adopted the concept of safety climate, and how safety climate 
research is developing in healthcare. We have seen that efforts have been made to validate 
measurement scales and analytical instruments used for identifying patient safety problems. A 
challenge that remains is to validate strategies to improve patient safety culture. Designs for 
some leadership strategies have been tested and the influence of hospital boards on patient 
safety has been studied. 
The Comprehensive Unit Based Safety Program (CUSP) was developed to improve patient 
safety culture in care giving units. It consists of six steps: assessing safety culture; science of 
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safety education; staff identify and prioritize safety concerns; senior executives adopt a unit; 
improvements implemented from safety concerns; efforts and results documented and analysed 
every month and results shared; and culture reassessed. A cornerstone in CUSP is that top 
leaders commit themselves to be part of an improvement team in the unit they partner with, and 
meet once a month to discuss improvement strategy and results with the group.  
CUSP was successfully implemented in the Keystone project, which included all hospitals 
with ICUs in Michigan. The intervention resulted in a 60% reduction of catheter related 
infections, as well as improvements in safety culture (21;70).  
A different strategy for safety climate improvement is the Leadership Walk Rounds model 
(76;77). Leadership Walk Rounds engage executives in dialogue with care-givers to identify 
patient safety hazards and to choose how to improve patient safety. The program demands a 
rigorous approach to elicit care-givers’ concerns about patient safety, near misses and adverse 
events, and should not be exchanged with ordinary leadership visits of a more superficial 
character. Walk Rounds have to be well prepared, with schedules planned, participants 
trained, data collection prepared, and with resources to process and feed back information and 
measurements of safety climate. 
A prospective intervention study was conducted to implement Leadership Walk Rounds in 
seven hospitals. Four of the seven hospitals complied with the weekly Walk Rounds but only 
two of them collected evaluation data systematically. Data from 21 patient care areas in the 
two hospitals was included in the analysis. At baseline, 48% of the care areas had safety 
climate scores below 60%. After Walk Rounds, 14% had safety climate scores below 60% 
without improving by 10 points or more.  
The intervention showed that Walk Rounds requires a significant amount of organizational 
will, and outstanding leadership engagement. When rigorously implemented, they improve 
safety climate and themes for improvement are identified.  
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The significance of leadership for improving patient safety culture is emphasized by the roles 
of leaders in both the CUSP and Leadership Walk Rounds models. How executive leadership 
influences safety climate has also been the focus of research in domains other than healthcare. 
In a study Zohar performed in 36 small to medium manufacturing plants in the metal, food, 
plastics and chemical industry, organization-level safety climate was compared to safety 
climate measurements at the group level. Examples of items used at the organizational level 
were: “Top management reacts quickly to solve the problem when told about safety hazards,” 
“Top management provides all the equipment needed to do the job safely,” “Top management 
listens carefully to workers’ ideas about improving safety,” “Top management is strict about 
working safely when work falls behind schedule,” and “Top management gives safety 
personnel the power they need to do their job.” Group level climates were measured with items 
like: “My direct supervisor makes sure we receive all the equipment needed to do the job 
safely,” “My direct supervisor discusses how to improve safety with us,” “My direct supervisor 
spends time helping us learn to see problems before they arise,” and “My direct supervisor says 
a ‘good word’ to workers who pay special attention to safety.” In this study, safety climate at 
the organizational level correlated significantly (p < 0.01) with safety climate measured at 
group level. Safety climate at organizational level also predicted safety behaviour at group level 
(p < 0.001) after controlling for risk. The effect of safety climate at the organizational level on 
safety behaviour was eliminated after controlling for group-level climate and risk, showing that 
the effect of organizational climate on safety behaviour is mediated by safety climate at group 
level (62). The study concludes that top leadership states the formal policies of an organization 
while leadership at lower levels interprets and enacts these policies in a context of competing 
operational demands. The behavioural consequences are then influenced by how staff expect to 
be rewarded or sanctioned for their safety behaviour. In this way, group level safety climate 
motivates role behaviour likely to be recognized and rewarded. Supervisors that constantly let 
 56 
production pressure undermine practice of safety routines will yield low safety climate levels 
and a higher probability of adverse events. Supervisors will, on the other hand, be under the 
influence of executive leadership. Group level climate variation will depend on how 
consistently executive leaders enforce their policies. Executive leadership has a larger impact 
when it is strong (62). Since safety climate is positively influenced by the quality of interaction 
between leadership and subordinates, the importance of dialogue between leaders and frontline 
workers cannot be overemphasized. 
 
3.5.1. Leadership priorities and patient safety 
One of the initiatives in the Keystone project (21) was to optimize ICU physician staffing. The 
measure highlights the significance of infrastructure. A study from Maryland shows how 
patient safety is influenced through priorities related to infrastructure. Information was gathered 
from discharge data on abdominal aortic surgery patients, and from medical directors of the 
ICUs that had cared for them. Organizational characteristics in the ICUs were related to 
variation in patients’ risk-adjusted morbidity and mortality following abdominal aortic surgery 
(78). ICUs that did not have daily rounds by physician specialists had a 3-fold increase in 
hospital mortality, as well as a 2- to 3-fold increased patient risk for a number of complications 
including cardiac arrest, acute renal failure, septicaemia, platelet transfusion, and re-intubation. 
Patients at ICUs with one nurse caring for three or more patients, compared to units with one 
nurse caring for one or two patients, were at increased risk of specific pulmonary 
complications, including pulmonary insufficiency after a procedure, and re-intubation of the 
trachea.  
How patient safety is influenced by the priorities of executive leaders was recently studied by 
comparing board practices on quality oversight with hospitals’ quality and safety performances. 
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Quality performance was measured in both process of care and outcomes (20). An example of 
process of care measure for heart attack was if patients had received aspirin, provided there was 
no aspirin contraindication, within 24 hours before or after hospital arrival. Hospital-level risk-
adjusted mortality rates for heart attack, heart failure and pneumonia were measured as 
outcome measures. 490 hospitals were included in the study. Significantly better processes of 
care scores and lower risk-adjusted mortality rates were found for hospitals that had a special 
board committee focusing exclusively on quality rather than for hospitals that did not.  The 
hospitals that had the CMO/VP of medical affairs on the board quality committee had 
significantly higher processes of care scores and significantly lower risk-adjusted-mortality 
than hospitals that did not have the CMO/VP of medical affairs on the committee.  
Hospitals that had ‘clinical quality’, ‘patient safety’ and ‘patient satisfaction’ as parameters on 
their dashboard had significantly higher scores in processes of care and lower risk adjusted 
mortality rates than the others. The hospitals that had a specific item on the board agenda 
devoted to quality, in most of their meetings showed significantly better scores in processes of 
care and lower mortality rates. Hospitals that included measures of quality and safety in the 
performance evaluations of  CEOs showed significantly better scores in processes of care and 
lower mortality rates.  
The two studies described above show how organizational characteristics at both the care 
giving and governing level relate to the safety of patient care. Although they represent limited 
evidence, their results suggest that patient safety culture is related to leadership priorities to 
ensure organizational support for patient safety.  
This is consistent with the experiences of the Institute of Healthcare Improvement (IHI) in the 
100K lives campaign. They found that the organizational context was more conducive to 
improvement in hospitals that excelled in patient safety results (79). Based on this experience 
and emerging research evidence, IHI identified properties that hospital boards can develop to 
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improve their approach to patient safety. This resulted in a guide  for “Getting boards on 
board,” IHI’s slogan for its recent 5 million lives campaign (79). The campaign set the target of 
reducing 5 million incidents of patient harm in hospitals from 2006 to 2008. It recommended 
12 interventions, of which only one was non-clinical: to engage governing leadership in quality 
and safety. 
To engage top management in quality and safety IHI recommended that boards in all hospitals 
undertake six key activities to reduce patient harm:  
• Set an aim to reduce harm to a specific level 
• Review last period’s progress toward safer care as the first agenda item at every board 
meeting 
• Identify a small group of organization-wide “roll-up” measures of patient safety, update 
the measures continually and make them transparent to the entire organization 
• Commit the organization to establish and maintain a safety culture that is respectful, 
fair, and just 
• Oversee execution of a plan to achieve aims to reduce harm, including executive team 
accountability for clear quality improvement targets.  
• Boards should spend at least 25% of their meeting time on safety issues, and regularly 
invite a patient, or a family member of a patient, who has experienced serious harm at 
their institution within the last year. 
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4. Measuring patient safety culture  
Although the science of patient safety culture is very young, the interest in applying the 
evidence it produces is high. In its “Leadership Guidelines to Patient Safety,” the IHI 
recommends doing safety culture surveys as an early step in strategies for improving patient 
safety. The purpose of establishing a baseline for patient safety culture is to be able to offer 
appropriate intervention to care-giving units that struggle with it (80).  
In this chapter some of the most frequent approaches for acquiring information about patient 
safety culture are outlined. Although the most conventional way of gathering information about 
patient safety culture is by doing surveys, there are also other approaches. A broader 
presentation is given of the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ), on which this thesis is 
based.  
4.1.  Qualitative approaches to patient safety culture 
Confidential inquiries, analysis of adverse events, audits, patients’ liability claims, semi-
structured interviews, focus group interviews, story telling, observation and Leadership Walk 
rounds are examples of sources of qualitative information on patient safety culture. Although 
many presume that patient safety culture is a relevant subject for qualitative research, not many 
have been conducted. An example of such a study from an operating theatre showed how 
doctors and nurses had different opinions on the safety benefits of rules and guidelines (81). 
Doctors found that patient safety sometimes benefited best by breaking rules while nurses 
found that patient safety was threatened by doctors breaking rules. Such issues are not captured 
well in quantitative surveys, although they may contribute to their results and therefore are 
important to recognize. The strength of qualitative methodology is that it identifies staff beliefs, 
attitudes and patterns of behaviour and provides an opportunity for them to discuss and review 
these. A group exercise, following quantitative surveys, where staff in the units discuss and 
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interpret the meaning of survey results in the context of the unit’s practical daily life, may 
reveal qualitative issues that are important for improving the unit’s patient safety culture (55).  
 
4.2. Semi-quantitative questionnaires 
Questionnaires have been made to help selected groups of staff identify and discuss problems 
with patient safety culture without quantifying them. The following questionnaires are 
examples of this. 
The Manchester Patient Safety Framework (MaPSaF) 
The Manchester Patient Safety Framework (MaPSaF) is a tool specifically developed to help 
healthcare organizations assess their progress in developing a safety culture (82). It is a 
structured guide that facilitates a group or a team to discuss and assess the organization’s 
maturity concerning ten different dimensions relevant to patient safety. The dimensions are: 1) 
Commitment to overall continuous improvement; 2) Priority given to safety; 3) System errors 
and individual responsibility; 4) Recording incidents and best practice; 5) Evaluating incidents 
and best practice; 5) Learning and effecting change; 7) Communication about safety issues;  8) 
Personnel management and safety issues; 9) Staff education and training; 10) Teamwork.  
How staff members assess the organization within these dimensions is expressed on a scale 
called “The maturity scale.” It stretches from Pathological (Why do we need to waste our time 
on patient safety issues?), through Reactive (We take patient safety seriously and do something 
when we have an incident), Bureaucratic (We have systems in place to manage patient safety), 
Proactive (We are always on the alert/thinking about patient safety issues that might emerge), 
to Generative (Managing patient safety is an integral part of everything we do). MapSaf is 
intended as a facilitative tool, not as a performance indicator. It pinpoints and facilitates 
discussion on problems with patient safety culture in the organization. There are no reports on 
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results from using the tool and it is not validated, although it is the most widely used safety 
culture tool in the United Kingdom (83).   
The “Strategies for Leadership ─ an Organizational Approach to Patient Safety” 
(SLOAPS) 
The purpose of “Strategies for Leadership ─ an Organizational Approach to Patient Safety” 
(SLOAPS) is to help health care organizations evaluate their patient safety culture and identify 
areas for improvement. It is completed by a multidisciplinary team consisting of a minimum of 
six individuals from frontline care, middle and top management. The questionnaire consists of 
53 items describing how patient safety is prioritized in six areas of management: 1) Leadership, 
2) Strategic planning, 3) Information and analysis, 4) Human resources, 5) Process 
management and 6) Patient and family involvement. The responders assess the extent to which 
the organization has achieved key aspects of patient safety; for example: 1) Patient safety is 
demonstrated as a top leadership priority; 2) The organization promotes a non-punitive culture 
for sharing information and lessons learned; 3) The organization routinely conducts an 
organization-wide assessment of the risk of error and adverse events in the care delivery 
process; 4) Adverse events  are analyzed to identify trends across events; 5) Reporting errors 
and safety driven decisions are rewarded and recognized; 6) Effective teamwork disregarding 
team members’ position of authority is fostered. Care delivery that avoids reliance on memory 
and vigilance is implemented. The tool is not validated and there are no reports on its use.  
The “Checklist for Assessing Institutional Resilience” (CAIR) 
The “Checklist for Assessing Institutional Resilience” (CAIR) instrument is intended to map 
organizational activity to increase their “resistance” to adverse events. It is a 20 item "wish list" 
of desirable features of a high reliability healthcare organisation for combating dangers to 
patients posed by human fallibility and systemic shortcomings (84). The items are process 
measures that reflect commitment, competence and communication to direct the institution’s 
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policies, procedures and practices in a proactive direction for preventing patient harm. 
Examples are: Safety-related issues are considered at high-level meetings on a regular basis, 
and not just after some bad event; Top management anticipates that staff will inevitably make 
errors, and trains them to detect and recover them.   
 
4.3. Quantitative surveys 
A number of questionnaires for quantitative surveys exist (52), including the “Hospital Survey 
on Patient Safety Culture” (HSOPS) (85), the “Veterans’ Administration Patient Safety 
Culture Questionnaire” (VHA PSCQ) (86), the “Culture of Safety Survey” (CSS) (87) and the 
“Safety Attitudes Questionnaire” (SAQ) (9;88). Reviews of a number of the most widely used 
quantitative safety culture survey instruments are presented by Colla, Bracken, Kinney and 
Weeks , and by Flin, Burns, Mearns, Yule and Robertson (89). In Table 4, an example of such 
a review is presented. The review includes SLOAPS, which we in this thesis consider to be a 
semi quantitative questionnaire because it does not result in data that can quantify staff 
perceptions but topics relevant for discussion in the units that fill it out. 
The “Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture” (HSOPS) 
 
The “Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture” (HSOPS) was released by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), US Department of Health and Human services, in 
November 2004. It assesses hospital staff opinions about patient safety issues, medical error, 
and event reporting. It includes 42 items, which measure 12 dimensions of patient safety 
culture. 
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Table 4 
 
 
Patient safety climate surveys: summary of characteristics 
 
 Name of survey  
  
 SLOAPS PSCHO VHA PSCQ HSOPS CSS SAQ SCS MSSA HTSSCS 
 
Setting appropriate for use General General General General General Multiple units Multiple units Pharmacy Transfusion 
General characteristics          
    To be completed by individuals No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
    No of items (demographics not  58 82/32 71 42 34 60 19 194 27 
    included)          
    Uses 5-point Likert scale Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    Measures implementation of actions Yes No No No No No No Yes No 
Common dimensions covered          
    Leadership Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial 
    Policies and procedures Yes Partial Yes Partial No Partial Partial Yes Partial 
    Staffing Yes Partial Yes Yes Partial Yes Partial Yes No 
    Communication Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    Reporting Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    Total no of dimensions 9 5 (16) 13 12 4 6  20 8 
Psychometrics performed          
    Item analysis No Partial Yes Yes No Yes Partial No Yes 
    Exploratory factor analysis No No Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
    Confirmatory factor analysis No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Partial No Yes 
    Cronbach’s alpha No No 0.45–0.90 0.63–0.83 "Poor" 0.68–0.81 "Good" 0.44–0.84 0.61–0.85 
    Test/retest reliability No No No No Yes Yes Partial No No 
    Correlated composite scores across  No No Yes Yes No Yes No Partial Yes 
    dimensions          
    Analysis of variance across services No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Partial Yes 
How used in studies          
    Intra institutional comparisons Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
    Inter institutional comparisons No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes 
    Inter industry comparisons No Yes No No No Yes Partial No No 
    Association with reporting rates No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
    Association with process measures No No No No Yes Yes No No No 
    Association with patient outcomes No No No No No Yes No No No 
    Pre v post intervention studies Partial No No No No Yes No No No 
 
SLOAPS, Strategies for Leadership: An Organizational Approach to Patient Safety;16,24,31 PSCHO, Patient Safety Cultures in Healthcare Organizations;25,32 VHA PSCQ, 
Veterans Administration Patient Safety Culture Questionnaire19 (McKnight and Lee, unpublished data, September 2001); HSOPS, Hospital Survey on Patient Safety;21,33 CSS, 
Culture of Safety Survey;18 SAQ, Safety Attitudes Questionnaire;22,23,26,34–39 SCS, Safety Climate Survey40 (10 item version called Safety Climate Scale24,40); MSSA, 
Medication Safety Self Assessment;17,41 HTSSCS, Hospital Transfusion Service Safety Culture Survey.20 
 
Reproduced from [Measuring patient safety climate: a review of surveys, Colla, J B, Bracken, A C, Kinney, L 
M, Weeks, W B, Qual Saf Health Care 2005 14: 364-366, Copyright © 2005] with permission from BMJ 
Publishing Group Ltd. 
 
 
The questionnaire is now widely used across the US and is increasingly being used worldwide. 
A database is provided to enable comparison between hospitals and to examine trends in patient 
safety culture over time. Reports on the psychometric properties of the questionnaire (85;90) 
are based on population samples, where criteria for sample selection vary as well as the 
response rate. In the pilot study, strategic samples from six hospitals were used to ensure 
representation of an adequate variety of job categories and hospital units, while only nurses and 
pharmacists were included from four other hospitals, and they were randomly chosen. The 
overall response rate was only 29%.  
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The “Veterans’ Administration Patient Safety Culture Questionnaire” (VHA PSCQ)  
The “Veterans’ Administration Patient Safety Culture Questionnaire” (VHA PSCQ)  is a 
forerunner to the HSOPS and results from a survey using this questionnaire had significant 
influence on the safety culture dimensions and types of items that were included in the pilot 
version of the HSOPS.  
The “Culture of Safety Survey” (CSS)  
The “Culture of Safety Survey” (CSS) is a modified version of the Stanford/PSCI culture 
survey. It was developed to survey patient safety culture at the hospital level of 15 Californian 
hospitals, in the four health care regions of Manitoba, Canada, in the fall of 2007 (86;91). The 
questionnaire includes items in seven dimensions: 1) organizational leadership for safety; 2) 
unit leadership for safety; 3) perceived state of safety; 4) shame and repercussions of 
reporting; 5) safety learning behaviours; 6) reporting culture; and 7) learning culture. It has 
been used to differentiate safety culture at both the hospital level and group level, not 
regarding recommended validity criteria for climate measurement (92). 
The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) 
The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire is a further development of the Intensive Care Unit 
Management Attitudes Questionnaire (10;74). It was originally derived from the Flight 
Management Attitudes Questionnaire (FMAQ) (93), a measuring instrument to model features 
of aviation safety culture, with a 20-year history in aviation (9). The SAQ consists of items 
both from the FMAQ, and new items generated on the basis of Vincent’s framework for 
analysing risk and safety (94) and Donabedian’s conceptual model for assessing quality (95).  
Vincent’s framework for analysing risk and safety systematically presents factors that influence 
safe performance in clinical practice. The framework is illustrated by the chain presented in 
Figure 1, showing how the factors interact. 
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Figure 1 
 
Reproduced from [Framework for analysing risk and safety in clinical medicine, Vincent, C, Taylor-Adams,S,  
Stanhope, N, BMJ Apr 1998; 316: 1154 - 1157, Copyright © 1998] with permission from BMJ Publishing Group 
Ltd. 
 
The framework incorporates the following factors and serves as an analytical instrument for 
exploring causes of adverse events:  
• Institutional context, including financial system, and regulations 
• Organizational and management factors, organizational structure, financial 
resources and constraints, safety culture and priorities 
• Work environment, staffing levels, skills, workload and shift patterns. Design, 
availability, and maintenance of equipment. Administrative and managerial support. 
• Team factors, communication, supervision, team structure  
• Individual factors, knowledge and skills, motivation, physical and mental health 
• Task factors, design and clarity of structure, availability and use of protocols, 
availability and accuracy of test results 
• Patient characteristics, condition, complexity and seriousness, language and 
communication, personality and social factors 
 
It gives organizations a conceptual overview enabling them to think systematically about their 
risk of experiencing adverse events and to develop instruments to assess this risk. SAQ is an 
example of such an instrument.  
Donabedian’s conceptual model not only addresses quality of patient outcome but also how 
processes of care and physical and organizational infrastructure contribute to it (95). As 
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described in Figure 2, it suggests that good structure increases the likelihood of good process 
which again increases the likelihood of good outcomes. The model is motivated by the idea 
that clinical results may be improved by revealing and addressing inadequate organizational 
infrastructure and clinical processes. The approach enables the assessment of the determinants 
of outcome in addition to the clinical outcome itself (96).  
Figure 2 
The model of structure, process and outcome has been applied with success in other industries 
like, for example, automobile manufacturing, where the Toyota Production System is a point 
of reference (97). Identifying inadequacies in organizational infrastructure before they lead to 
adverse events is a proactive approach that gives opportunities for further quality 
improvements in healthcare. The model represents a change from inspecting to promoting the 
quality of clinical results. In this approach the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) is a 
relevant measure, since it maps staff attitudes both toward hospital infrastructure (“All the 
necessary information for diagnostic and therapeutic decisions is routinely available to me,” 
“The levels of staffing in this clinical area are sufficient to handle the number of patients”) 
Structure Process Outcomes 
Donabedian’s framework of structure, process and outcomes 
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and processes of care-giving (“The physicians and nurses here work together as a well-
coordinated team”).  
The items of the SAQ were evaluated through pilot testing and exploratory factor analysis, 
which led to identification of the following six factors: 1) Safety Climate, 2) Teamwork 
Climate, 3) Stress Recognition, 4) Perceptions of Management, 5) Working Conditions and 6) 
Job Satisfaction. The SAQ has been adapted for use in ICUs, operating rooms, inpatient wards, 
ambulatory clinics, emergency departments, maternity wards, and pharmacies. It also exists in a 
generic version where the care-giving areas are not specified in the items like in “Nurse input is 
well received in this ICU,” but instead is kept neutral like in “Nurse input is well received in 
this care-giving area.”  In the short form version that we have used, six items are added to the 
30 items belonging to the six factors. The additional items were added because they were 
considered interesting in their own right by senior leaders participating in the pilot studies (9).  
The SAQ is the most widely used instrument for measuring patient safety culture. Including our 
Norwegian translation, the SAQ has now been translated into seven languages, and has been 
administered in over 2000 hospitals in the USA, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany, 
Norway, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, Taiwan and New Zealand (spoken communication, 
Bryan Sexton, Johns Hopkins Quality and Safety Research group, May 2008).  
The SAQ is probably the best documented instrument for measuring patient safety culture 
(9;17). Benchmark scores from 203 clinical areas in the USA, UK and New Zealand have 
been published with an overall response rate of 67%, ranging from 66% to 72% across 
administrations. Incomplete data at item level was approximately 1.5% overall, with a range 
between 0.3 and 3.5%. Multilevel confirmatory factor analysis produced a highly satisfying 
set of goodness of fit indicators. Composite scale reliability was assessed with Raykov’s  ρ 
coefficient, which was 0.90,  indicating strong reliability (9). A well-developed patient safety 
culture, as measured by the SAQ, has been shown to correlate with fewer medication errors, 
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lower ventilator associated pneumonia rates, fewer blood-stream infections, and shorter ICU 
lengths of stay (17;21). Although the evidence of this is limited, the SAQ is the only 
questionnaire with results that link patient safety scores to patient outcome. 
To calculate the factor scores one must first reverse the results of negatively worded items. 
From the mean of the set of items one subtracts 1, and the result is multiplied by 25. The 
percentage of respondents who “agree slightly” or “agree strongly” for each of the items within 
a factor is charted as the percent positive for each SAQ factor. 
In a meeting with the expert group on patient safety culture under the Nordic minister council, 
on the 3rd of June 2009, Allan Frankel, who invented Leadership Walk Rounds, shared his 
experience on the success criteria for doing quantitative patient safety culture surveys. He 
emphasized that administrative capacity needs to be available to conduct the survey as well as 
research capacity to analyze and feed back the results.  
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5.  Our Survey  
5.1. The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire  
We chose to use the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire, generic version (Short form 2006), 
because we found it to be the best internally and externally validated questionnaire (17). The 
psychometric properties, documenting internal construct validity, have been published with 
data from more than 200 sites in the UK, USA and New Zealand, including ICUs, ORs, 
Inpatient settings and Ambulatory clinics with a response rate of 67 % (9). It has also been 
tested for test/retest reliability. The SAQ’s external validity has been studied by exploring the 
relationship between safety climate scores and patient outcomes. Although the evidence is 
limited, favourable scores were associated with shorter lengths of stay, fewer medication errors, 
lower ventilation associated pneumonia rates and lower blood stream infection rates 
(17;71;98;99). They were also associated with lower risk adjusted patient mortality rates.  Only 
the SAQ has been used in pre- versus post- intervention studies.  
 
5.2. Translation  
Linguistic validation of our translation was performed with the back-translation technique 
(100). First, one translator did the translation from English to Norwegian and then an 
independent translator (an American nurse and researcher who has worked for many years in 
Norway and is fluent in both languages), who was blinded to the original questionnaire, 
translated it back into the source language. We (ED and DH) compared independently the 
instrument in its original English version and the version translated back to English, and 
discussed the re-translation with one of the authors of the American questionnaire. We 
reformulated a small number of the translated items before we used the Norwegian version of 
the questionnaire at Akershus University Hospital.  
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5.3. Setting  
The survey was carried out in the somatic clinical areas of Akershus University Hospital from 
October-December 2006. The hospital has 500 somatic (and 200 psychiatric) beds, 4200 
employees, and an annual budget of 2,500,000,000 NOK (approximately 450 million USD). It 
serves a population of 280,000 people, treats 53,000 in-patients and provides 150,000 out-
patient consultations annually. 85% of in-patients are unscheduled emergency admissions. 
Since we had no examples of the SAQ being used in psychiatric settings we chose to leave 
these out. We regret that because we later realized it would have been relevant; safety culture 
in psychiatric facilities is proposed to be related to the incidence of homicides in relation to 
psychiatric patients (101). 
The safety culture survey was part of a patient safety strategy the hospital had adopted, 
following guidelines developed by the Institute of Healthcare Improvement (80). The heads of 
the clinical departments were informed about the survey in a meeting and in a letter from the 
CEO.  
 
5.3.1. Approval by Data Inspectorate and report to Regional Ethics Committee 
The study was approved by the Norwegian Data Inspectorate. We also reported the study plan 
to the regional ethics committee for medical research in Eastern Norway, who decided that it 
did not need their explicit approval as it did not involve patients. 
 
5.4. Questionnaire administration 
Data were collected during regular staff meetings in 47 somatic care-giving units in agreement 
with unit leaders. Since most physician groups did not have staff meetings but had meetings for 
reporting and education, we met them in these settings instead. Completing the questionnaire 
was voluntary. We experienced that staff were enthusiastic and the response rate in the 
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meetings was high, with the exception of two units. In the first group the leader and some 
influential individuals were highly critical of the questionnaire, concluding that the survey was 
meaningless. Before completing the survey they all arose and said they were due to go to a 
scheduled X-ray meeting.  
In the other group we were asked by the contact person, who was not the leader, to not proceed 
with the survey in their unit. That was after the person had seen the questionnaire and discussed 
it with other staff. The reason they gave was that the unit was small and dysfunctional and the 
results would be difficult to handle within the group.  
Questionnaires were distributed to 1911 frontline personnel in 14 ambulatory clinics, 27 wards, 
four labs, one operation unit, and one anaesthetic department. 762 staff received the SAQ in 
staff meetings and 1149 did so through the hospital’s postal system. 1306 staff members 
completed and returned the questionnaire, with a response rate of 68%. 
To alleviate fears of small-group responder identification, we promised that results would not 
be reported across professions at unit level. Staff not present at the meetings were sent the 
questionnaire by hospital mail, with a preaddressed envelope and a sheet with information 
about the survey attached. To keep track of the number of questionnaires administered, 
questionnaires were numbered individually. The responders’ names were not recorded in the 
questionnaire and there were no name-and-number lists. Those who completed their 
questionnaire during the meeting were crossed out from the list of employees by the unit leader, 
who later told us who had not attended the meeting and would have to get their questionnaire 
by mail. Those who received it by mail crossed out their names on their local unit’s list when 
they returned the questionnaire. To reduce the number of non-responders, a designated person 
in the care-giving unit was asked to remind persons who hadn’t crossed out their name in 
meetings and by poster. This worked out variably. Although we achieved a reasonable response 
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rate of 68%, it may have been even better if we had been able to remind those who had not 
returned the questionnaire, by mail. To do so we would have needed a name-and-number list. 
In order to ensure that all staff that work in the units and contribute to their culture were 
included in the survey, we gave the physicians and physiotherapists, who commonly work at 
more than one care-giving unit, the opportunity to fill out one questionnaire for each of up to 
three units where they worked; for example the ER, ward and ambulatory clinic. To keep 
account of the response rate the three questionnaires filled out by physicians and 
physiotherapists had the same number, but were supplied with an additional a, b, and c. 
Physicians and physiotherapists were asked to identify which care-giving unit and department 
their responses referred to; for other responders these boxes were filled out in advance. The 
information sheet contained a list of the care-giving units participating in the study. 
 
5.5. Data quality and processing 
Missing responses at item level was on average 2.9%, within a range of 0 to 13%. This is more 
than in the benchmarking data but not too bad. Item responses were clearly skewed toward the 
positive, but showed considerable variation. For all items, all categories were ticked.  
Questionnaires were scanned by the optical reading program Snap Survey. In cases where 
different postal responders had used different names for the same care-giving unit (for example, 
“S5” and “Big children ward”), we harmonized the names into a complete and mutually 
excluding list of unit names. The confirmatory analysis was done by AMOS. SPSS was used to 
estimate Cronbach’s alpha, item-to-own correlations, intercorrelations of factors, test-retest 
correlations and all item-descriptive statistics.  
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6. Statistical analysis 
The first hypothesis we wanted to test was if the published factor structure for benchmarking 
data from the US, the UK and New Zealand also fitted the Norwegian data adequately. Since 
the factor structure from benchmarking studies was already published, we tested if our data had 
the same factor structure by doing a confirmatory factor analysis.   
We also wanted to explore at what organizational level the variation was greatest in order to 
understand at what level patient safety culture should be addressed. We tested our second 
hypothesis: Patient safety culture scores mapped by the Norwegian questionnaire vary by ward 
and department, but more across wards than across departments, by doing a multilevel analysis. 
Finally, we wanted to explore if leaders and their subordinates have the same perceptions on 
the extent to which patient safety is important to the organization. The result would reveal if 
assessments of frontline staffs’ perceptions could provide an additional source of information 
about the safety climate in the care-giving units that supplements filtered information from 
their leaders. We did this by testing our third hypothesis: Safety climate assessments amongst 
frontline staff differ from the perceptions of their superiors. The test was done by an 
independent samples T-test 
 
6.1. Confirmatory factor analysis 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was done to test the first hypothesis, by using AMOS, a 
computer program that provides formal tests of the goodness of the fit of factor models that are 
pre-hypothesised for the data. Acceptable goodness of fit-values indicate internal construct 
validity, meaning that the factor structure of our data fits adequately to the pre-hypothesized 
factor structure of the benchmarking data. We have reported the following goodness-of-fit 
indices in our article: the chi square, the chi-square/df-ratio, the p, the pclose, the Adjusted 
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Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI), the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and 
the Hoelter 0.05. Suggested criteria values are chi-square, not exceeding the number of degrees 
of freedom of the model, although Wheaton & Al (102) suggest accepting any chi square/df-
ratio under 5, and Carmines and MacIver (103) consider values of 2-3 acceptable, whereas 
Byrne (104) will not accept ratios above 2. The p and p close values should exceed 0.05 (105), 
although Jöreskog (106) cautions that large samples may preclude such low p-values even in 
good models – which is why the Hoelter 0.05 (107), an estimate of the largest sample for which 
a data set with these intercorrelations among the variables would confirm the model, should 
exceed 200. The Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index should be close to 1 – but most AGFIs are, 
and it is not clear which lower values speak against the model. The Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RSMEA) should not exceed 0.10 (105). 
 
 
6.2. Psychometric properties 
The internal consistency of the factors was also done to test the first hypothesis, by assessing 
item-total correlations, checking that all items were more highly correlated with the factor 
they were hypothesised to belong to than with any other factor, and by Cronbach’s alpha 
(consistent factors should have alphas exceeding 0.7), which shows to what extent items 
within each factor correlate to each other (108).  
The test-retest reliability was assessed in the hospital’s radiology lab, which with its 97 
employees is one of the largest clinical units in the hospital. Its questionnaires were, in 
addition to the serial number, marked to show if the questionnaire was from the first 
measurement or the second. The time interval between the two measurements was three 
weeks. Test-retest stability was assessed by the intraclass correlation coefficient, which 
should exceed 0.7 (109). We found these to be high for all factors, except for Stress 
recognition (0.55) and Perceptions of hospital management (0.44). The test-retest correlation 
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for Perceptions of hospital management was practically zero for non-physicians, but quite 
high (0.83) for physicians. A possible interpretation is that in the average clinical worker's 
eyes, the hospital's top management is so distant that it is difficult to maintain a stable 
perception of its qualities.  
 
6.3. Score calculation 
Scores were calculated for each responder for each of the seven patient safety culture factors 
according to the instruction given by the SAQ-developers 
http://www.uth.tmc.edu/schools/med/imed/patient_safety/Scale%20Computes.DOC . The 
factor scores were added to the data file as seven new variables.  
 
6.4. Multilevel analysis 
The second hypothesis was tested by analyzing the seven patient safety culture factor scores 
using MLWin, a multilevel analysis program developed by the University of London’s Institute 
of Education (110). Multilevel analysis makes it possible to partition the variance in the data by 
level. By applying what is known as “the empty model” – a model which contains only the 
intercept (the data set’s average patient safety attitudes score) and no explanatory variables, we 
split the total variance in patient safety attitudes scores into variance across individual 
respondents (individual level variance), across wards (ward level variance) and across 
departments (department level variance.) 
The ratio of the variance at the organizational levels to the total variance in the data is the 
intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). Multiplied by 100, the ICC can be interpreted as the 
percentage of the total variance in the data set that belongs to the organizational level, that is, 
the percentage of the variance which is not score differences across individual responders, but 
across the organizational units.  
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The statistical significance of the variance at organization levels should be judged by the 
change in the goodness of fit of the model to the data – as measured by the change in the 
model’s log likelihood ratio – produced by eliminating that level from the model. Judging 
significance by the ratio of the parameter estimate to its standard error works quite well for 
fixed parameters, that is, parameters estimated under the assumption of having the same value 
in all subunits of the data set. For random parameters, however, the distribution of this ratio 
may depart considerably from normality, and a better test for random parameters is to use the 
likelihood ratio statistic (111). In our case, the “large sample” distribution of the -2LL-value 
under the null hypothesis (H0 = the two-level model is adequate) is a χ2-distribution with k2-k1 
degrees of freedom – that is: d.f. = 3-2= 1. The critical value for p < 0.05 for the change in -
2LL is 3.84, and for p < 0.01 it is 5.99. As suggested by Pinheiro & Bates (112) this test can be 
conservative, producing a p-value which is greater than it should be.    
 
 
6.5. Independent samples T-test 
To study the relation between the patient safety perceptions of charge nurses and their 
subordinate staff, we used data for charge nurses, nurses, midwives, and nurse assistants in the 
care giving units as well as personnel categorized as “other” (like bioengineers and 
radiographers in the labs).   
For each care giving unit we computed the mean value of the Safety Climate factor score (one 
of the seven SAQ factors) for charge nurses, nurses, nurse assistants and “other” staff 
categories. The difference between the score value for every person and the mean score for the 
unit in which they were working was calculated. To test the third hypothesis we compared the 
difference between individual value and care giving unit mean value for charge nurses and 
other staff by independent samples T-test.  
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7. Findings and summary of papers  
7.1. Main findings 
We started this thesis by making an overview of patient safety research, which until recently 
has had its main focus on mechanisms for adverse events and risks related to physical and 
organizational infrastructure. What the concept of patient safety culture adds to previous 
research is methods to evaluate if staff perceives that adverse events and risks related to 
organizational infrastructure are safely addressed. In this perspective, the different research 
approaches are mutually dependent.  
We translated what we considered to be the best internally and externally validated 
questionnaire for assessing staff perceptions on patient safety culture, the Safety Attitudes 
Questionnaire (SAQ). The Norwegian translation of the questionnaire was well accepted and 
gave a response rate of 68%.  
Confirmatory factor analysis showed that with small adjustments, the Norwegian data fitted 
the factor model well. This supports the first hypothesis: ‘The published factor structure for 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire benchmarking data from the US, the UK and New Zealand 
also fits the Norwegian data adequately’. The psychometric properties of the translated 
version were adequate. We also found a correlation between our own data and measurements 
of patient harm in five departments (the only departments with such data available) which 
provided preliminary evidence of the questionnaire’s predictive validity. Measurements of 
patient harm were done by medical record review with Global Trigger (50).  
Multilevel analysis showed substantial variance at organizational level, most of it at ward 
level. This supports the second hypothesis: ‘Patient safety culture scores mapped by the 
Norwegian questionnaire vary by ward and department, but more across wards than across 
departments’. Our recommendation was that to improve patient safety culture in hospitals one 
cannot exclude efforts directed toward ward level. 
 78 
Using independent samples T-test we found that charge nurses had significantly more positive 
perceptions of the safety climate in their area of responsibility than their subordinate staff. The 
result supports the third hypothesis: ‘Perceptions of safety climate amongst employees follow a 
hierarchical pattern and are more positive the further away from the patients the employees 
work’. Our result may indicate that information about patient safety culture is filtered as it 
moves upwards in the hospital hierarchy. The assessment of frontline staff perceptions of 
patient safety climate is therefore an additional source of information that supplements reports 
that a manager receives from subordinate leaders. The finding emphasizes the significance of 
doing patient safety culture surveys. 
The following pages summarize the articles on which the thesis is based.  
 
7.2 Roadmap for patient safety research: approaches and road forks ─ 
Summary of paper 1  
 
Dag Hofoss, Ellen Deilkås  
Published in Scand J Publ Health 2008; 36(8): 812-7 
 
 
Patient safety improvement and research has become a health care priority worldwide. The 
purpose of this paper was to give an overview of patient safety research and analyze what 
knowledge patient safety culture research can add to it. Pioneer research reports include the 
1984 Harvard Medical Practice Study, and the 1999 report “To err is human.” Patient safety 
research is expanding rapidly. Among the Scandinavian countries, Denmark is the patient 
safety improvement leader, and Norway is the laggard, having only recently institutionalized 
safety research and then having started with industrial safety research, and only recently having 
expanded into patient safety research. 
Patient safety research can be conducted along a number of lines. To identify patient safety 
problems and come up with ideas for patient safety improvement one can investigate: 1) 
particular cases of adverse events, 2) the design of health care delivery systems, or 3) the 
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culture of the care-giving institutions. The study of safety culture can be sub-divided into the 
study of organization culture in general (and in particular of leadership culture) and the study of 
patient safety culture. The article provides a number of references to existing instruments of 
patient safety research.   
Scrutinizing adverse events for errors is health care’s traditional way of improving patient 
safety. The idea of re-thinking the design of care delivery systems has been accompanied by 
claims of modernity. The study of patient safety culture is the most recent approach. Although 
chronology suggests a developmental trend, the three approaches should not necessarily be 
seen as steps on evolution’s ladder. Each has its merits.  
 
7.3 Psychometric properties of the Norwegian version of the Safety 
Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ), Generic version (Short Form 2006) ─ 
Summary of paper 2 
 
Ellen T Deilkås  and Dag Hofoss 
Published in BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:191 
 
In this paper we present how we translated the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) to 
Norwegian and validated the psychometric properties of the translated version. The 
questionnaire was translated with the back translation technique and was tested in 47 clinical 
units in a Norwegian university hospital. SAQ's (the Generic version (Short Form 2006), the 
version with the two sets of questions on perceptions of management: on unit management and 
on hospital management) were distributed to 1911 frontline staff. 762 were distributed during 
unit meetings and 1149 through the postal system. Questionnaire acceptability was good: 1306 
staff members completed and returned the questionnaire: a response rate of 68%. Cronbach’s 
alphas, item-to-own correlations, and test-retest correlations were calculated, and response 
distribution analysis and confirmatory factor analysis were performed, as well as early validity 
tests. The reliability measures were acceptable. Cronbach's alphas (0.68 to 0.85) of our seven 
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factors are described in detail in Appendix 1. For no factor the exclusion of any variable would 
noticeably increase the Cronbach’s alpha value. In the confirmatory factor analysis 36 items 
were ascribed to seven pre-hypothesized factors: Teamwork Climate, Safety Climate, Stress 
Recognition, Perceptions of Hospital Management, Perceptions of Unit Management, Working 
Conditions, and Job Satisfaction. Goodness-of-Fit Indices showed reasonable model fit. Details 
on these results are found in the article. External validity indicators – recognizability of results, 
correlations with "trigger tool"-identified adverse events, patient satisfaction with 
hospitalization, patient reports of possible maltreatment, and patient evaluation of organization 
of hospital work – provided preliminary validation. Based on the data from Akershus 
University Hospital, we concluded that the Norwegian translation of the SAQ showed 
satisfactory internal psychometric properties. With data from one hospital only, we could not 
draw strong conclusions on its external validity, and further validation studies linking the SAQ-
scores to patient outcome data should be performed. 
 
7.4 Patient safety culture: partitioning the variance by organization level 
─ Summary of paper 3 
 
Ellen Deilkås, Dag Hofoss 
Submitted to BMC Health services research 
 
 
The aim of this paper was to examine to what degree patient safety culture scores vary not only 
by individual responder, but also by ward and department. We wanted to determine at what 
organizational level they varied the most, to learn more about at what organizational level 
patient safety culture should be addressed. Culture is influenced by what groups learn through 
collective experiences, especially those that demand leadership. When leaders are forced to 
prioritize between production demands and safety precautions, they demonstrate their cultural 
values. Because wards to a greater degree than departments operate at the frontline of 
healthcare, we expected such learning to happen to a larger degree at ward level than at 
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department level. We referred to the previous article for a description of the data collection and 
psychometric validation of the translated version of the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ 
Short Form 2006) which we used to collect the data. We did the multilevel analysis by MLWin 
version 1.10. Considerable parts of the score variations were at ward and department level. 
More organization level variation was at ward level than at department level. Our conclusions 
were: 1) Patient safety culture should be studied as close to the patient as possible. There may 
be such a thing as “hospital safety culture,” and there are differences across hospital 
departments. But neglecting the study of patient safety culture at ward level will mask 
important local variations. 2) Patient safety culture improvement efforts should include 
interventions at ward level, not just department or all-hospital interventions. The results should 
be used within wards to point out its specific problems with patient safety culture. 3) In 
recognition of the fact that operational tasks are often solved by microsystems working within 
wards, we concluded that future patient safety research and improvement efforts should not 
stop at the level of hospital wards, out-patient clinics, and ERs, but should also collect and 
analyze patient safety culture data on the microsystems.  
 
7.5. Charge nurses perceive a better safety climate than their subordinate  
staff ─  Summary of paper 4 
 
Ellen T Deilkås, Dag Hofoss  
Submitted to BMC Health services research  
 
Are perceptions of patient safety climate influenced by the perceiver’s position in the 
organizational hierarchy? Top management declares what priority patient safety should have 
in the organization’s policy, but normally leaves it to frontline leaders to strike the balance 
between safety policy and other operational requests. Middle-level leaders have to prioritize 
patient safety in the face of funding restraints and increasing patient needs. Patient safety 
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climate measurements reflect the extent to which staff perceives that patient safety is 
important to the organization.  
1306 staff in 47 somatic care-giving units filled out the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire, in a 
500-bed Norwegian university hospital, from October to December 2006. The mean value of 
perceptions of safety climate was computed for charge nurses, nurses, nurse assistants and 
“other” subordinate staff in each care-giving unit. 
The mean difference between each individual’s perception of safety climate and the mean value 
for all responders in their own care-giving unit was -0.61 for subordinate staff and + 7.0 for 
charge nurses. This is a significant difference (p < 0.001).  
Charge nurses perceived a better safety climate than subordinate staff in the care-giving unit 
where they were in charge. Our interpretation is that executive leaders would benefit from 
knowing the perceptions of both, e.g., as mapped by safety culture surveys, instead of having to 
rely solely on patient safety information filtered through the layers of the organization, which 
may attenuate the messages given by the front-line care providers. 
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8. Discussion  
Until now we have looked at how a new approach to patient safety has developed in health care 
management and showed how assessing patient safety culture is a relevant strategy in this 
approach. We have demonstrated how patient safety culture can be measured by scientific 
methods from organizational psychology, using our own questionnaire as an example. We have 
summarized our results on how patient safety culture scores vary according to organizational 
level and how staff and leaders perceive safety climate differently. We will now recapitulate 
why we chose to do patient safety culture research and why we chose to use the Safety 
Attitudes Questionnaire. We will consider how our results have implications for sample size 
when measuring patient safety culture, and finally discuss how our results are relevant for 
leaders that want to improve patient safety. 
  
8.1. Deciding to do Patient safety culture research  
Some may say that the new approach to patient safety is like old wine in new bottles. They may 
argue that the concern for patients’ safety is age old, and that although adverse events happen 
to patients, they are often so sick that not treating them would pose a greater risk than doing so.  
Hospital patients are often vulnerable. Large blood losses or periods of very low blood pressure 
may increase the risk of having a heart attack. Immobilised patients are prone to venous 
thrombus embolism. The patient safety approach does not rule out the risks related to patients’ 
health conditions but deals with how well they are addressed when care is planned and 
delivered. That includes ensuring well functioning technical equipment, good routines for 
communication and coordination between health workers, and care giving units, and good 
routines for training staff and organizing their work load. The latter is illustrated by the 
following story. 
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A man with torticollis, a neurologic condition which makes his head tip backwards 
uncontrollably, was scheduled for brain surgery. In the meeting with the neurosurgeon before 
the operation, the man asked the surgeon how many times he had done this procedure before. 
The answer was zero. Because he didn’t want to be the first, the man cancelled the operation 
and searched the international community for surgeons with more experience. He found one in 
Finland who had performed the procedure 50 times. This surgeon later trained Norwegian 
neurosurgeons in the procedure.   
Unfortunately, not all patients are capable of addressing the risks of their own treatment. They 
should not have to do so either. According to the oath of Hippocrates, this responsibility 
belongs to the health care worker. It means that health care is obliged to not only consider what 
treatment is the best for the patient but also be concerned with how safely it is delivered. The 
patient safety approach is therefore applying an age old concern to the reality of modern 
healthcare. Since healthcare in recent decades has become increasingly complex in how it is 
delivered, and is potent in its treatment, the potential for adverse events has increased. The 
patient safety methodology provides tools to face this and to do something about it. The 
knowledge about this approach has developed into a new science. 
By validating the Norwegian translation of the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ), we have 
chosen the cultural context as our gateway to patient safety research. Alternatively, we could 
have studied mechanisms for adverse events and tested interventions to reduce them. This 
could have provided knowledge useful for guiding preventive efforts. Instead, we have decided 
to study how healthcare workers at the sharp end perceive the priority of patient safety in their 
working unit, to what extent a blame free environment is encouraged, and to what extent 
information about organizational mishaps and adverse events is welcomed. Although the 
evidence that links safety climate to safety behaviour and outcomes for patients is scarce, the 
fact that it exists (11;12;16;113) gives meaning to pursue further studies. The reason is that if 
 85 
they prove to be externally valid, safety climate surveys will not only inform leaders about staff 
perceptions but they may also indicate how safely patients are treated. Our decision to do 
patient safety culture research is supported by a WHO expert group that ranks patient safety 
culture as number three on a prioritized list of 50 patient safety research topics in developed 
countries (5). 
As a clinician I am not unbiased to choose this perspective on patient safety. Experiences of 
junior physicians lacking possibilities to communicate to leadership about how organizational 
conditions undermine patient safety have motivated me to develop a way to improve this 
situation. This aim may have influenced the research questions I have posed as to how this 
questionnaire could be used, and how useful it might be as a tool. My personal motivation 
may have led me to present the questionnaire with greater enthusiasm in meetings with 
frontline staff, which again would influence response rate. 
However, modern theory of knowledge has dismissed the idea of the neutral scientist that 
does not influence knowledge development. The scientists’ background, professional 
interests, motives and personal experiences influence the choices of perspectives and methods 
in the research  (114). In qualitative science this is countered by assessing subjectivity, 
referred to as reflexivity. This means adequately accounting for the effects of the positioned 
researcher during all steps of the research process. By choosing a quantitative design my bias 
in this study has to some extent been compensated for. If my hypothesis that safety culture 
varies to a significant degree at the organizational level was wrong, we would not have been 
able to reject the null hypothesis. If my hypothesis that staff perceptions vary according to 
their position in society was wrong, we would not have been able to reject the null hypothesis 
claiming no coherence between the two. It means that although I am biased in my position the 
results in the study are strengthened by the validation strategies in the quantitative design 
(115).  
 86 
8.2. Choosing the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire 
The arguments for choosing to use the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) in this project 
have already been presented (p70). In addition to it being the best internally and externally 
validated questionnaire, the SAQ together with the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety 
(HSOPS), which is also validated in Norwegian (by the University of Stavanger  (116)), are 
considered to be the two questionnaires that best fit the criteria for recommendation, by a 
preliminary report from the European Network for Patient Safety. The EUNetPas is a project 
funded and supported by the European Commission. The HSOPS includes the dimension of 
teamwork across hospital units, which is the research topic that the previously mentioned 
WHO expert group has ranked as the highest area of prioritization for patient safety research 
in developing countries (5). In the dimension for perceptions of local management the HSOPS 
includes questions like: “My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job 
done according to established patient safety procedures” and “Whenever pressure builds up, 
my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it means taking shortcuts.” The items 
capture well how safety climate represents the priority of safety in relation to other competing 
interests (64).  
We do not think there are strict arguments for choosing either one instead of the other for 
patient safety culture assessments because both the SAQ and the HSOPS have unique 
qualities. The decision to start doing patient safety culture assessment is more important than 
the choice between these two questionnaires. However, we have concerns regarding the 
organizational level for doing such measurements and how this has consequences for 
selecting a sample. Based on the results from testing our second hypothesis and the research 
evidence (Chapter 3.2.), we believe that the sample for measuring patient safety culture must 
be large enough to allow the results to be broken down to ward level, where much variation in 
safety climate scores is found.  
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8.3. Methodological concerns for measurements of patient safety culture 
8.3.1     Considering the appropriate organizational level  
Safety climate theory emphasises how safety priorities at local management level reflect both 
top management’s safety priorities and local leaders’ capability to enact these in competition 
with other operational demands (62;65). A weak leadership at top level will facilitate greater 
climate variations at group level. Although significant clustering of some safety attitude 
factors was found at department level in our study, our main result is that most of the 
clustering was at ward level. Where there was significant clustering at department level, 
variance at ward level was greater. Our interpretation is that departments may differ in how 
well they are able to support staff efforts to treat patients safely, but that wards vary even 
more. The results are supported by Pronovost et al. (117) who also found more variability in 
safety culture measurements between working units than between hospitals and concluded 
that safety culture is a local phenomena. We therefore believe that the working unit is a 
relevant organizational level for measuring and improving patient safety culture, as well as for 
doing further patient safety culture research. We suggest that patient safety culture may also 
be important for clinical microsystems too. Microsystems are groups of clinicians and staff 
working together with a shared clinical purpose to provide care for a population of patients 
(72). They are not visible in formal organizational blueprints, but still exist as contexts of 
clinical care, often across care-giving units. The safety culture is determined by the whole 
team that participates in patient care (92) and we therefore believe that perceptions from the 
whole team probably should be mapped in safety culture assessments. We propose this to be 
studied further in future research. 
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8.3.2.   Deciding sample size 
 In deciding the sample size for patient safety culture studies it is important to realize that the 
sample needs to be large enough to validly measure both strength and level of the climates 
that the patient safety culture consists of. Climate strength is the deeper level of consensus 
amongst staff in the responding unit. The consensus will show how well staff in the units 
agree on the climate mean they have reported (92). Climate level is the mean level of 
perceptions in the responding unit (118), and shows if the climate is good or bad. With 
increasing consensus the climate levels will better predict safety outcomes (12).  
In the HSOPS guidelines several strategies are presented for selecting samples. One option is 
to administer surveys to all hospital staff; another option is to administer surveys to subsets of 
staff from all or some areas. The preferable alternative depends on the level one intends to 
measure the organizational climate. A small sample is probably adequate to measure 
organizational climate at hospital level, but not to precisely measure climate strength and 
climate level in the working units. In order to be able to break the variation in patient safety 
culture down to unit level, samples must include enough staff in the working units (92). The 
critical issue is to avoid bias introduced by non responders. To ensure reliable results, a rule 
of thumb is that the response rate in the sample should be above 60% (117). 
When reporting results from the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire the custom is to present the 
percentage of staff that reports a good safety climate in each responding unit. This is an 
effective way of showing information on both the climate strength (consensus) and climate 
level in the working unit (70). An example is how the CUSP intervention at Keystone in 
Michigan was reported, where teamwork climate in 72 Intensive care units (ICU) was 
reported to range from 16% to 92% of caregivers reporting good teamwork climate before the 
intervention (70). 17% of the ICUs had a > = 60% consensus of good teamwork before the 
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intervention, while 46% had a > = 60% consensus or a 10-point improvement after the 
intervention.  
 
8.4. Opportunities for leadership to improve patient safety culture 
We have previously presented how safety climate is influenced by leadership priorities and 
have described validated leadership strategies for improving patient safety culture. The 
question is whether leaders are aware of the need for such strategies. Results presented in the 
fourth paper support our hypothesis and suggest that leaders tend to perceive a better safety 
climate than their subordinates. We will discuss how this is relevant for the question of doing 
patient safety culture surveys.   
To what extent do top leaders base their priorities to improve patient safety culture on their 
perceptions of the safety climate? Although we cannot be sure we find it reasonable to expect 
that leaders who recognize problems with safety culture are more likely to do something about 
it. We therefore believe that a mismatch between perceptions of frontline staff and their leaders 
may be unfortunate for working units where the safety culture is low. Improvement of their 
safety culture depends on incentives, which their leadership lacks. The following studies 
demonstrate how a good safety culture depends to a large degree on leadership.  
In a  two-part Nursing Climate Scale study (12), significant variation in nursing climate was 
found at both hospital and work unit levels, predicting routine medication safety scores and 
emergency safety scores. Hospital and unit climates interacted giving the best and the worst 
results where the climates at the two levels were aligned. A positive climate at work unit level 
could, however, compensate for a detrimental hospital climate: leaders at work unit level can 
make a difference in a healthcare system that in itself gives little priority to patient safety. In 
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the Nursing Climate Scale study (12), the best safety scores were found in hospitals where both 
leadership at hospital level and unit level gave patient safety high priority.  
In a  study performed on 401 working groups in 36 small to medium manufacturing plants, the 
relationship between safety climate at organizational level and work unit level and safety 
behavior at work unit level was explored (62). Safety behavior was observed by using a 
standardized checklist of nine safety behavior categories (e.g., use of protective equipment, 
machine handling, materials handling) adapted from the European Commission’s 2005 safety 
audit guide. Independent safety audits were also conducted by an independent senior safety 
inspector using the same checklist. Safety climate was correlated between organizational and 
group levels. The effect of safety climate at organizational level on employees’ safety behavior 
was fully mediated by safety climate at group level (62).  
In our study we found that frontline staff had relatively low perceptions of hospital 
management’s priority to patient safety compared to perceptions of teamwork climate, safety 
climate and job satisfaction. Our interpretation is that a clinical culture of patient safety may ─ 
and often does ─ precede management commitment to patient safety. This suggests that we 
maybe would have found an even better culture of patient safety if perceptions of management 
commitment to patient safety had been perceived to be higher. On the other hand, frontline 
staff’s low perceptions of hospital management’s patient safety commitment may also reflect 
little interaction with management, as well as a lack of knowledge on how committed 
management really is. It may also reflect a lack of initiative related to patient safety issues, 
because management perceives a better safety climate than their subordinates.  
The significance of leadership is consistent with experiences the Institute of Healthcare 
Improvement (IHI) did in the 100K lives campaign and with recent research (79;119), showing 
that hospitals that excelled in patient safety results also had favorable organizational 
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environments. The patient safety results were measured by clinical quality and risk adjusted 
mortality scores in hospitals.  They depended on how much time boards spend on quality issues 
at board meetings, if they had a particular board quality committee and how it was composed, if 
quality performance reports were used and if senior executives compensation was linked to 
quality improvement and if medical staff was involved in the quality strategy  (20;120). The 
IHI concluded that hospital boards lack priority for quality and safety improvement, and have 
made it a focal point, in their last campaign, to get “the boards on board.”  
Although the priorities for quality and safety in healthcare have not been changed much by 
Total Quality Management (121), recognition of the significance of hospital board routines 
may perhaps lead to a change. But governance priorities are not enough to ensure a good safety 
climate at work unit level. That also depends on the priorities of leaders at lower levels. 
Hospital boards may provide the recognition that subordinate leaders need to be able to 
compensate for lacking support for safety from executive leaders. By using a balanced set of 
performance metrics, board members may ensure that patient safety is enacted and not 
marginalized by production demands. 
One example of a balanced set of system-level measures, which enables board members and 
other health care leaders to evaluate their health care systems, is the Whole System Measures 
(122). It is made to reflect the six important quality dimensions of patient care: safe, effective, 
patient centred, timely, efficient, and equitable, and consists of 13 measures (51).  The 
measures include: 1) rate of adverse events (measured by medical chart review, for example, 
with Global trigger tool); 2) incidence of nonfatal occupational injuries and illnesses; 3) 
Hospital standard mortality ratio; 4) Unadjusted Raw mortality percentage, 5) Functional health 
outcomes score; 6) Hospital readmission percentage; 7) Reliability of core measures; 8) Patient 
Satisfaction with care score; 9) Patient experience Score; 10) Days to third next available 
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appointment; 11) Hospital days per decedent during the last six months of Life; 12) Health care 
costs per capita; and 13) Equity. 
In our study we found that charge nurses perceived a better safety climate than their 
subordinate staff.  This is supported by another study that found senior managers to perceive a 
better safety climate than their subordinate leaders and frontline workers (123). Both studies 
show that perception of safety climate depends on the responder’s position in the hierarchy. 
The causes may be: 
First, the further away from the front line employees are placed, the less they are exposed to 
patient safety hazards. A position higher in the hierarchy will easily give an emotional distance 
to patients that experience unsafe incidents, and will reduce its influence on how they perceive 
the safety climate. 
Second, the further away a leader is from the front line, the more the information on patient 
safety, which gets through to the leader, will be filtered. That is related to the number of times 
the information is handed over from person to person. 
Third, employees in an organization with a bad safety climate may feel discomfort in reporting 
about near misses and adverse events for a number of reasons, including that they may believe 
that this information is not desired by management. In such a climate leaders may not hear 
much about problems that undermine patient safety.  
It is plausible to think that leaders who perceive a better safety climate than their subordinates 
need more exposure to the consequences of safety hazards. Such experiences have the potential 
to break down emotional distance and give them unfiltered information about how patient 
safety is addressed in their organization. This approach seems to be the basis of the Leadership 
Walk Rounds strategy, which emphasizes the importance of facilitating a dialogue between 
executive leaders, subordinate leaders and caregivers at the frontline. By hearing patients that 
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have experienced harm tell their story and by learning how routines and infrastructure in their 
organization influences the context of patient care, a better understanding of their influence on 
patient safety may develop. Some concerns of frontline workers may also demand solutions 
that need to be found at higher organizational levels, especially if they demand coordination 
with other units and departments. Such concerns will perhaps be more easily surfaced to 
executive leaders in direct contact than if it had to be passed on through several levels of 
leaders. Meeting with care giving units, listening to their concerns, and dealing with the 
concerns afterwards also gives executive leaders an opportunity to demonstrate their true 
priority of patient safety. 
In studying the interaction between supervisors and subordinates, Zohar found that it increased 
significantly in groups where the supervisors were given feedback based on standardized 
interviews with the subordinates  (54). In the intervention, which resulted in significant 
improvement in the workers’ safety behavior and safety climate scores, subordinates gave 
information about how their supervisors communicated the priority of safety over competing 
goals like speed or schedules. The study shows the significance of the interaction between 
leadership and frontline workers to maintain a good safety climate. 
How this can be done in healthcare is demonstrated in the previously described models of 
CUSP, and Leadership Walk Rounds. Both facilitate cooperation between frontline workers, 
their unit leader and an executive leader to improve patient safety culture. After the 
intervention of the previously mentioned (p.55) Leadership Walk Rounds, staff perceptions on 
safety climate improved for all staff categories, except for charge nurses (77). Charge nurses’ 
perceptions became worse after the intervention, approaching the level of nurses and staff 
physicians. One reason may be that the intervention which facilitates a dialogue with 
subordinate staff and physicians, gave the charge nurses a more realistic picture of how well 
patient safety was supported in their unit.  
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The fact that leaders perceive a better safety climate than their subordinates should probably be 
considered when decisions are made on whether to do patient safety culture surveys or not.  
Because good safety cultures depend on leadership support, their access to unfiltered 
information about the safety of patient care is crucial. Survey data from patient safety culture 
assessments may be used in preparation for and evaluation of Leadership Walk Rounds and 
CUSP, using the results within wards to point out its specific problems with patient safety 
culture (15;117). It is important to avoid stigmatizing low-scoring units as “low-scorers.” Also, 
low-performing wards are not the only providers of useful information. Results from high-
scoring units are equally interesting and may suggest solutions to specific problems with 
patient safety culture.   
Although Pronovost and Sexton have shown that variation of safety culture is considerably 
greater at work unit level than at hospital level (117), best results are achieved where patient 
safety is given priority by both executive leadership and leaders at work unit level (12). This 
gives meaning to further exploration of how patient safety priority at executive level can be 
increased.  
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9. Conclusion 
In our review of patient safety research we have identified the following approaches, to study 
1) particular cases of adverse events, 2) the design of health care delivery systems, or 3) the 
culture of the care-giving institutions. Although patient safety culture research is the most 
recent approach, we believe that they are equally important for improving patient safety.  
The Norwegian translation of the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire produced data that fitted the 
factor structure of published benchmarking data. Our first hypothesis was hence supported, and 
we could go further on applying the questionnaire to test our two other main hypotheses.  
A significant part of the variation of patient safety scores was found at ward level. This 
strengthens our second hypothesis and implies that surveys of patient safety culture should 
include enough staff to be able to break the results down to ward level (Chapters 3.2. and 
8.3.1.).   
We finally found that charge nurses perceive a better safety climate than their subordinates 
which supports our third hypothesis. The result suggests that patient safety information is 
increasingly filtered the higher up it is reported in the organization. Safety culture surveys 
provide access to unfiltered information about how staff perceive that patient safety is 
supported where they work. The information may be useful when healthcare leaders plan 
interventions for patient safety improvement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 96 
Reference List 
 
 (1)  Brennan TA, Leape LL, Laird NM, Hebert L, Localio AR, Lawthers AG, et al. 
Incidence of adverse events and negligence in hospitalized patients. Results of the 
Harvard Medical Practice Study I. N Engl J Med 1991 Feb 7;324(6):370-6. 
 (2)  Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, Donaldson MS, (Eds). To Err is Human. Building a Safer 
Health System. Washington DC: National Academy Press; 1999. 
 (3)  Donaldson L. An organisation with a memory. UK: The Stationary Office Limited; 
2000. Report No.: 1. 
 (4)  The Research Priority Setting Working Group of the World Alliance for Patient 
Safety. Summary of the Evidence on Patient Safety: Implications for Research. 
Geneva, Switzerland: WHO Press, World Health Organization, 2008.  
 (5)  Bates DW, Larizgoitia I, Prasopa-Plaizier N, Jha AK, on behalf of the Research 
Priority Setting Working Group of the WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety. 
Global priorities for patient safety research. BMJ 2009 May 23;338:1242-4. 
 (6)  Guldenmund FW. The nature of safety culture: a review of theory and research. Saf 
Sci 2000 Feb;34:215-57. 
 (7)  Flin R. Measuring safety culture in healthcare: A case for accurate diagnosis. Saf Sci 
2007 Jul;45(6):653-67. 
 (8)  Dov Z. Safety climate and beyond: A multi-level multi-climate framework. Saf Sci 
2008 Mar;46(3):376-87. 
 (9)  Sexton J, Helmreich R, Neilands T, Rowan K, Vella K, Boyden J, et al. The Safety 
Attitudes Questionnaire: psychometric properties, benchmarking data, and emerging 
research. BMC Health Serv Res 2006;6(1):44. 
 (10)  Sexton JB, Thomas EJ, Helmreich RL. Error, stress, and teamwork in medicine and 
aviation: cross sectional surveys. BMJ 2000;320:745-9. 
 (11)  Hofmann D, Mark B. An investigation of the relationship between safety climate 
and medication errors as well as other nurse and patient outcomes . Personnel 
Psychology 2006;59(4):847-69. 
 (12)  Zohar D, Livne Y, Orly T, Admi H, Donchin Y. Healthcare climate: A framework 
for measuring and improving patient safety. Critical Care Medicine 2007 
May;35(5):1312-7. 
 (13)  Kirk S, Parker D, Claridge T, Esmail A, Marshall M. Patient safety culture in 
primary care: developing a theoretical framework for practical use. Qual Saf Health 
Care 2007 Aug 1;16(4):313-20. 
 (14)  Bodur S, Filiz E. A survey on patient safety culture in primary healthcare services in 
Turkey. Int J Qual Health Care 2009 Oct 1;21(5):348-55. 
 97 
 (15)  Frankel A, Grillo SP, Pittman M, Thomas EJ, Horowitz L, Page M, et al. Revealing 
and Resolving Patient Safety Defects: The Impact of Leadership WalkRounds on 
Frontline Caregiver Assessments of Patient Safety . Health Serv Res 
2009;43(6):2050-66. 
 (16)  Pronovost PJ, Berenholtz SM, Goeschel C, Thom I, Watson SR, Holzmueller CG, et 
al. Improving patient safety in intensive care units in Michigan. Journal of Critical 
Care 2008 Jun;23(2):207-21. 
 (17)  Colla JB, Bracken AC, Kinney LM, Weeks WB. Measuring patient safety climate: a 
review of surveys. Qual Saf Health Care 2005;14:364-6. 
 (18)  Sir Liam Donaldson. World alliance for Patient Safety. WHO, France: WHO; 2005.  
 (19)  Cook RI, Render M, Woods DD. Gaps in the continuity of care and progress on 
patient safety. BMJ 2000 Mar 18;320(7237):791-4. 
 (20)  Jiang HJ, Lockee C, Bass K, Fraser I. Board oversight of Quality: Any Differences 
in Prcess of Care and Mortality. Journal of Healthcare Management 2009 
Jan;54(1):15-30. 
 (21)  Pronovost PJ, Berenholtz SM, Goeschel CA, Needham DM, Sexton JB, Thompson 
DA, et al. Creating High Reliability in Health Care Organizations. Health Serv Res 
2006 Aug;41:1599-617. 
 (22)  Kenney C. The best practice - How the New Quality Movement Is Transforming 
Medicine. New York: PublicAffairs; 2008. 
 (23)  (Eds). Gjennombruddsprosjekter. Homepage, The Norwegian Medical Association 
2009Available from: URL: http://www.legeforeningen.no/id/79985 
 (24)  Wachter RM, Pronovost PJ. The 100,000 Lives Campaign: A Scientific and Policy 
Review. Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Patient Safety 2006 Nov; 32 ( 
11):621-7. 
 (25)  Berwick DM, Hackbarth AD, McCannon CJ. IHI Replies to "The 100 000 Lives 
Campaign: A Scientific and Policy Review". Joint Commission Journal on Quality 
and Patient Safety 2006;32(11):628-33. 
 (26)  Learning from Bristol: the report of the public inquiry into children's heart surgery at 
the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984 -1995.  the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry; 2001 
Jul.  
 (27)  Vincent C. Patient Safety.  London : Elsevier 2006; 2006. 
 (28)  Australian Patient Safety Foundation - History and Objectives. Australian Patient 
Safety Foundation 2009 August 9Available from: URL: 
http://www.apsf.net.au/history.php 
 (29)  Canadian Patient Safety Institute. Canadian Patient Safety Institute 2009Available 
from: URL: http://www.patientsafetyinstitute.ca/English/Pages/default.aspx 
 98 
 (30)  Scottish Patient Safety Alliance . Scottish Patient Safety Alliance 2009Available 
from: URL: http://www.patientsafetyalliance.scot.nhs.uk/ 
 (31)  Poulsen J. Dansk Selskab for Patientsikkerhed. Ugeskr Læger 2002;164(17):2253. 
 (32)  Dansk Selskab for Patientsikkerhed. Dansk Selskab for Patientsikkerhed 
2009Available from: URL: http://www.patientsikkerhed.dk/ 
 (33)  Haynes AB, Weiser TG, Berry WR, Lipsitz SR, Breizat AH, Dellinger EP, et al. A 
Surgical Safety Checklist to Reduce Morbidity and Mortality in a Global Population. 
N Engl J Med 2009 Jan 29;360(5):491-9. 
 (34)  Apkon M, Leonard J, Probst L, DeLizio L, Vitale R. Design of a safer approach to 
intravenous drug infusions: failure mode effects analysis. Qual Saf Health Care 2004 
Aug 1;13(4):265-71. 
 (35)  Marx DA, Slonim AD. Assessing patient safety risk before the injury occurs: an 
introduction to sociotechnical probabilistic risk modelling in health care. Qual Saf 
Health Care 2003 Dec 1;12(90002):33ii-38. 
 (36)  Wreathall J, Nemeth C. Assessing risk: the role of probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) in patient safety improvement. Qual Saf Health Care 2004 Jun 1;13(3):206-
12. 
 (37)  Reason J. Human error: models and management. BMJ 2000 Mar 
18;320(7237):768-70. 
 (38)  Bagian JP, Gosbee J, Lee CZ, Williams L, McKnight SD, Mannos DM. The 
Veterans Affairs Root Cause analysis System in Action. Jt Comm J Qual Improv 
2002;28(10):531-45. 
 (39)  Sari AB-A, Sheldon TA, Cracknell A, Turnbull A. Sensitivity of routine system for 
reporting patient safety incidents in an NHS hospital: retrospective patient case note 
review. BMJ 2007 Jan 13;334(7584):79. 
 (40)  Vincent C. Incident reporting and patient safety. BMJ 2007 Jan 13;334(7584):51. 
 (41)  Surbone A, Rowe M, Gallagher TH. Confronting Medical Errors in Oncology and 
Disclosing Them to Cancer Patients. J Clin Oncol 2007 Apr 20;25(12):1463-7. 
 (42)  Billings C. Incident reporting systems in medicine and experience with the aviation 
reporting system. In: In Cook RI WDMCe, editor. A tale of two stories: contrasting 
views of patient safety.  North Adams, MA: US National Patient Safety Foundation; 
1998. p. 52-61. 
 (43)  Resar RK, Rozich JD, Classen D. Methodology and rationale for the measurement 
of harm with trigger tools. Qual Saf Health Care 2003 Dec 1;12(90002):39ii-45. 
 (44)  Wilson RM, Runciman WB, Gibberd RW, Harrison BT, Newby L, Hamilton JD. 
The Quality in Australian Health Care Study. Med J Aust 1995 Nov 6;163(9):458-
71. 
 99 
 (45)  Wilson RM, Harrison BT, Gibberd RW, Hamilton JD. An analysis of the causes of 
adverse events from the Quality in Australian Health Care Study. Medical Journal of 
Australia 1999;170(9):411-5. 
 (46)  Vincent C, Neale G, Woloshynowych M. Adverse events in British hospitals: 
preliminary retrospective record review. BMJ 2001 Mar 3;322(7285):517-9. 
 (47)  Baker GR, Norton PG, Flintoft V, Blais R, Brown A, Cox J, et al. The Canadian 
Adverse Events Study: the incidence of adverse events among hospital patients in 
Canada. CMAJ 2004 May 25;170(11):1678-86. 
 (48)  Schioler T, Lipczak H, Pedersen BL, Mogensen TS, Bech KB, Stockmarr A, et al. 
[Incidence of adverse events in hospitals. A retrospective study of medical records]. 
Ugeskr Laeger 2001 Sep 24;163(39):5370-8. 
 (49)  Leape LL, Brennan TA, Laird N, Lawthers AG, Localio AR, Barnes BA, et al. The 
nature of adverse events in hospitalized patients. Results of the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study II. N Engl J Med 1991 Feb 7;324(6):377-84. 
 (50)  Griffin FA, Resar R. IHI Global Trigger Tool for Measuring Adverse Events 
(Second Edition). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute for Healthcare Improvement; 
2009.  
 (51)  Institute of Medicine CoQoHCiA. Crossing the Quality Chasm. A New Health 
System for the 21st Century. Washington, DC: National Academies Press; 2001. 
 (52)  Nieva VF, Sorra J. Safety culture assessment: a tool for improving patient safety in 
healthcare organizations. Qual Saf Health Care 2003;12(Suppl 2:ii):17-23. 
 (53)  Zohar D. A group-level model of safety climate: Testing the effect of group climate 
on microaccidents in manufacturing jobs.  Journal of Applied Psychology 2000 
Aug;85(4):587-96. 
 (54)  Zohar D, Luria G. The use of supervisory practices as leverage to improve safety 
behavior: A cross-level intervention model. Journal of Safety Research 
2003;34(5):567-77. 
 (55)  Sexton JB, Paine L, Manfuso J, Holzmueller CG, Martinez E, Moore D, et al. A 
Check-up for Safety Culture in "My Patient Care Area". The Joint Commission 
Journal on Quality and Patient Safety 2007 Nov;33(11):699-703. 
 (56)  Hofstede G. Cultural dimensions in management and planning. Asia Pacific Journal 
of Management 1984 Jan 1;1(2):81-99. 
 (57)  Morgan G. Creating Social reality - Organizations as Cultures. In: Morgan G, editor. 
Images of Organization.Beverly Hills: Sage Publications; 1986. p. 111-40. 
 (58)  Helmreich RL, Merritt AC. Culture at Work in Aviation and Medicine. Burlington: 
Ashgate; 1998. 
 (59)  Schein E. Organizational Culture. American Psychologist 1990 Feb;45(2):109-19. 
 100 
 (60)  Lawrence J, Demaree R, Wolf G. Estimating within-group interrater reliability with 
and without response bias. Journal of Applied Psychology 1984 Feb;69(1):85-98. 
 (61)  Mark B, Hughes L, Belye M, Chang Y, Hofmann D, Jones C, et al. Does safety 
climate moderate the influence of staffing adequacy and work conditions on nurse 
injuries?  J Safety Res 2007 Nov 5;38(4):431-46. 
 (62)  Zohar D, Luria G. A multilevel model of safety climate: cross-level relationships 
between organization and group-level climates. J Appl Psychol 2005 Jul;90(4):616-
28. 
 (63)  Zohar D. Modifying Supervisory Practices to Improve Subunit Safety: A 
Leadership-Based Intervention Model. Journal of Applied Psychology 
2002;87(1):156-63. 
 (64)  Zohar D. The Influence of Leadership and Climate on occupational Health and 
Safety. In: Hofmann D, Tetrick L, editors. Health and Safety in Organizations: A 
Multilevel Perspective. Pfeiffer; 2003. p. 201-27. 
 (65)  Zohar D. The effects of leadership dimensions, safety climate, and assigned 
priorities on minor injuries in work groups. Journal of organizational behavior 2002 
Feb;23(1):75-92. 
 (66)  Deilkas E, Hofoss D. Psychometric properties of the Norwegian version of the 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ), Generic version (Short Form 2006). BMC 
Health Serv Res 2008;8(1):191. 
 (67)  Walton MM. Hierarchies: the Berlin Wall of patient safety. Qual Saf Health Care 
2006 Aug 1;15(4):229-30. 
 (68)  Edmondson AC. Speaking Up in the Operating Room: How Team Leaders Promote 
Learning in Interdisciplinary Action Teams. J Manage Stud 2003 Sep;40( 6):1419-
52(34). 
 (69)  Mannion R, Davies HTO, Marshall MM. Cultures for performance in health care. 
Maidenhead UK: Open University Press; 2005. 
 (70)  Pronovost PJ, Berenholtz SM, Goeschel C, Thom I, Watson SR, Holzmueller CG, et 
al. Improving patient safety in intensive care units in Michigan. Journal of Critical 
Care 2008 Jun;23(2):207-21. 
 (71)  Pronovost P, et al. An Intervention to Decrease Catheter-Related Bloodstream 
Infections in the ICU. N Engl J Med 2006 Dec 28;355(26):2725-32. 
 (72)  Mohr J, Batalden P, Barach P. Integrating patient safety into the clinical 
microsystem. Qual Saf Health Care 2004 Dec 1;13(suppl_2):ii34-ii38. 
 (73)  McKinley KE, Berry SA, Laam LA, Doll MC, Brin KP, Bothe A, et al. Clinical 
Microsystems, Part 4. Building Innovative Population-Specific Mesosystems. Joint 
Commission Journal on Quality and Patient Safety 2008 Nov;34:655-63. 
 101 
 (74)  Thomas EJ, Sexton JB, Helmreich RL. Discrepant attitudes about teamwork among 
critical care nurses and physicians. Crit Care Med 2003;31(3):956-9. 
 (75)  Makary MA, Sexton JB, Freischlag JA, Holzmueller CG, Millman EA, Rowen L, et 
al. Operating Room Teamwork among Physicians and Nurses: Teamwork in the Eye 
of the Beholder. Journal of the American College of Surgeons 2006 
May;202(5):746-52. 
 (76)  Thomas EJ, Sexton JB, Neilands TB, Frankel A, Helmreich RL. The effect of 
executive walk rounds on nurse safety climate attitudes. A randomized trial of 
clinical units BMC Health Services Research 2005;5:28. 
 (77)  Frankel A, Grillo S, Pittman M, Thomas E, Horowitz L, Page M, et al. Revealing 
and Resolving Patient Safety Defects: The Impact of Leadership WalkRounds on 
Frontline Caregiver Assessments of Patient Safety. Health Serv Res 2008 Jul 
30;43(6):2050-66. 
 (78)  Pronovost P, Morlock L, Dorman T. Creating and Maintaining Safe Systems of ICU 
Care. In: Vincent JL, editor. Yearbook of intensive care and emergency 
medicine.Berlin: Springer Verlag; 2001. p. 695-708. 
 (79)  Conway J. Getting Boards on Board: Engaging Governing Boards in Quality and 
Safety. The Joint Commision Journal on Quality and Patient Safety 2008 
Apr;34(4):214-20. 
 (80)  Botwinick L, Bisognano M, Haraden C. Leadership Guide to Patient Safety. 
Cambridge , Massachusetts: Institute for Healthcare Improvement; 2006.  
 (81)  McDonald R, Waring J, Harrison S, Walshe K, Boaden R. Rules and guidelines in 
clinical practice: a qualitative study in operating theatres of doctors' and nurses' 
views. Qual Saf Health Care 2005 Aug 1;14(4):290-4. 
 (82)  Manchester Patient Safety Framework (MaPSaF). National Patient Safety Agency 
2008 July 25 [cited 2008 Jul 25];Available from: URL: 
http://www.npsa.nhs.uk/patientsafety/improvingpatientsafety/humanfactors/mapsaf/ 
 (83)  Mannion R, Konteh FH, Davies HTO. Assessing organisational culture for quality 
and safety improvement: a national survey of tools and tool use. Qual Saf Health 
Care 2009 Apr 1;18(2):153-6. 
 (84)  Carthey J, de Leval MR, Reason JT. Institutional resilience in healthcare systems. 
Qual Saf Health Care 2001 Mar 1;10(1):29-32. 
 (85)  Sorra JS, Nieva VF. Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture. (Prepared by Westat, 
under Contract No. 290-96-0004). AHRQ Publication.  Rockville, MD: Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality; 2004. Report No.: 0041. 
 (86)  Burr M, Sorra J, Nieva VF. Analysis of the Veterans Administration (VA) National 
Center for Patient Safety (NCPS) FY 2000 Patient Safety Questionnaire. Technical 
report.  AHRQ; 2002.  
 102 
 (87)  Weingart SN, Farbstein K, Davis RB, Phillips RS. Using a multihospital survey to 
examine the safety culture. Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Safety 
2004;30:125-32. 
 (88)  Sexton JB, Thomas EJ, Helmreich RL, Neilands TB, Rowan K, Vella K, et al. 
Frontline Assessments of Healthcare Culture: Safety Attitudes Questionnaire Norms 
and Psychometric properties. Technical report 04-01.  2004.  
 (89)  Flin R, Burns C, Mearns K, Yule S, Robertson EM. Measuring safety climate in 
health care. Qual Saf Health Care 2006 Apr 1;15(2):109-15. 
 (90)  Smits M, Christiaans-Dingelhoff I, Wagner C, Wal G, Groenewegen P. The 
psychometric properties of the 'Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture' in Dutch 
hospitals. BMC Health Serv Res 2008;8(1):230. 
 (91)  Singer SJ, Gaba DM, Geppert JJ, Sinaiko AD, Howard SK, Park KC. The culture of 
safety: results of an organization-wide survey in 15 California hospitals. Qual Saf 
Health Care 2003 Apr 1;12(2):112-8. 
 (92)  Zohar D. Safety Climate: Conceptual and Measurement Issues. In: James Campbell 
Quick, Lois Tetrick, editors. Handbook of Occupational Health 
Psychology.Washington,D.C.: American Psychological Association; 2003. p. 123-
42. 
 (93)  Helmreich RL, Merritt AC, Sherman PJ, Gregorich SE, Wiener EL. The Flight 
Management Attitudes Questionnaire. Technical Report. Austin, TX: The University 
of Texas; 1993. Report No.:  93-4. 
 (94)  Vincent C, Taylor-Adams S, Stanhope N. Framework for analysing risk and safety 
in clinical medicine. BMJ 1998 Apr 11;316(7138):1154-7. 
 (95)  Donabedian A. The Quality of Care: How Can It Be Assessed? JAMA 1988 Sep 
23;260(12):1743-8. 
 (96)  Resar RK. Making Noncatastrophic Health Care Processes Reliable: Learning to 
Walk before Running in Creating High-Reliability Organizations. Health Serv Res 
2006 Aug;41:1677-89. 
 (97)  Ohno T. Toyota Production System - Beyond Large-Scale Production. New York: 
Productivity, Inc.; 1988. 
 (98)  Pronovost P, Weast B, Rosenstein BJ, Sexton B, Holzmueller CG, Paine L, et al. 
Implementing and validating a comprehensive unit-based safety program. J Patient 
Saf 2005;1:33-40. 
 (99)  Sexton JB. A Matter of life or death: Social psychological and organizational factors 
related to patient outcomes in the intensive care unit. Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation 2002. 
 (100)  Sperber AD. Translation and validation of study instruments for cross-cultural 
research. Gastroenterology 2004 Jan;126(Supplement 1):S124-S128. 
 103 
 (101)  Tidmarsh D. Psychiatric risk, safety cultures and homicide inquiries. Journal of 
Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology 1997;8(1):138-51. 
 (102)  Wheaton B, Muthén B, Alwin DF, Summers GF. Assessing reliability and stability 
in panel models. In: In Heise DRT, editor. Sociological Methodology.San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass; 1977. 
 (103)  Carmines EG, McIver JP. Analyzing models with unobserved variables. In: 
Borhnstedt GW, Borgatta EF, editors. Social measurement: current issues.Beverly 
Hills: Sage; 1981. 
 (104)  Byrne BM. A primer of LISREL. Basic applications and programming for 
confirmatory factor analysis models. New York: Springer-Verlag; 1989. 
 (105)  Browne M, Cudeck R. Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In: Bollen KA, Long 
JS, editors. Testing structural equation models.Newbury Park, California: Sage; 
1993. p. 136-62. 
 (106)  Jöreskog K. A general approach to confirmatory maximum likelihood factor 
analysis. Psykometrika 1969;34:183-202. 
 (107)  Hoelter JW. The analysis of covariance structures: goodness-of-fit indices. 
Sociological Methods and Research 1983;11:325-44. 
 (108)  Nunnally J, Bernstein I. Psychometric Theory . 3rd ed. New York: McGraw Hill; 
1994. 
 (109)  Garratt AM, Bjertnaes OA, Barlinn J. Parent experiences of paediatric care (PEPC) 
questionnaire: reliability and validity following a national survey. Acta Paediatrica 
2007 Feb 3;96(2):246-52. 
 (110)  Rasbash J, Steele F, Browne W, Prosser B. A user's guide to MLwiN version 2.0. 
London: Institute of Education; 2004. 
 (111)  Woodhouse G. Multilevel modelling applications. A guide for users of 
MLn.London: University of London, Institute of Education; 1996. p. 32. 
 (112)  Pinheiro J, Bates D. Mixed-effects models in S and S+.New York: Springer; 2004. 
p. 83-4. 
 (113)  Pronovost PM, Weast BM, Rosenstein BM, Sexton JBP, Holzmueller CGB, Paine 
LM, et al. Implementing and Validating a Comprehensive Unit-Based Safety 
Program. Journal of Patient Safety 2005 Mar;1(1):33-40. 
 (114)  Malterud K. Qualitative research: standards, challenges, and guidelines. The Lancet 
2001 Aug 11;358(9280):483-8. 
 (115)  Hellevik O. Forskningsmetode i sosiologi og statsvitenskap. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget; 2002. 
 104 
 (116)  Sorra JS, Nieva VF. Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture. (Prepared by Westat, 
under Contract No. 290-96-0004). AHRQ Publication.  Rockville, MD: Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality; 2004. Report No.: 0041. 
 (117)  Pronovost P, Sexton B. Assessing safety culture: guidelines and recommendations. 
Qual Saf Health Care 2005 Aug 1;14(4):231-3. 
 (118)  Scale computation instructions.  28-8-2008.  
http://www.uth.tmc.edu/schools/med/imed/patient_safety/Scale%20Computes.DOC.  
  Ref Type: Online Source 
 (119)  Vaughn T, Koepke M, Kroch E, Lehrman W, Sinha S, Levey S. Engagement of 
Leadership in Quality Improvement Initiatives: Executive Quality Improvement 
Survey Results. Journal of Patient Safety 2006;2(1). 
 (120)  Kroch E, Vaughn T, Koepke M, Roman S, Foster D, Sinha S, et al. Hospital Boards 
and Quality Dashboards. J Patient Saf 2006;2:10-9. 
 (121)  Øvretveit J. Total quality management in European healthcare. International Journal 
of Health Care Quality Assurance 2000;13(2):74-80. 
 (122)  Martin L, Nelson EC, Lloyd RC, Nolan T. Whole System Measures. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Institute for Healthcare Improvement; 2007.  
 (123)  Singer SJ, Falwell A, Gaba DM, Baker LC. Patient Safety Climate in US Hospitals: 
Variation by Management Level. Medical Care 2008;46(11):-1149. 
 
 
 




























RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Patient safety culture lives in departments and
wards: Multilevel partitioning of variance in
patient safety culture
Ellen Deilkås*, Dag Hofoss
Abstract
Background: Aim of study was to document 1) that patient safety culture scores vary considerably by hospital
department and ward, and 2) that much of the variation is across the lowest level organizational units: the wards.
Setting of study: 500-bed Norwegian university hospital, September-December 2006.
Methods: Data collected from 1400 staff by (the Norwegian version of) the generic version of the Safety Attitudes
Questionnaire (SAQ Short Form 2006). Multilevel analysis by MLwiN version 1.10.
Results: Considerable parts of the score variations were at the ward and department levels. More organization
level variation was seen at the ward level than at the department level.
Conclusions: Patient safety culture improvement efforts should not be limited to all-hospital interventions or
interventions aimed at entire departments, but include involvement at the ward level, selectively aimed at low-
scoring wards. Patient safety culture should be studied as closely to the patient as possible. There may be such a
thing as “hospital safety culture” and the variance across hospital departments indicates the existence of
department safety cultures. However, neglecting the study of patient safety culture at the ward level will mask
important local variations. Safety culture research and improvement should not stop at the lowest formal level of
the hospital (wards, out-patient clinics, ERs), but proceed to collect and analyze data on the micro-units within
them.
Background
Although the risk of harming patients is evident to most
caregivers, eliminating or reducing risk has not always
been the first priority of health care management. Man-
agement often takes the safety of patients for granted,
and considers patient safety as the responsibility of care-
givers honouring the guideline “primum non nocere”.
Compared to other Scandinavian countries, Norway
has only recently made patient safety a national health
policy issue, following a series of non-governmental calls
for action, most notably by professor emeritus Peter F.
Hjort’s 2004 policy suggestion [1] and 2007 textbook
[2]. In 2007 the Directorate of Health established a
national unit for patient safety and in 2009 the Ministry
of Health launched a national patient safety campaign.
Efforts to improve patient safety may follow several
lines of action, including mortality-and-morbidity con-
ferences, sentinel event scrutiny, restructuring of care
delivery systems and safety culture surveys [3]. Each
strategy has its merits, and surveying safety culture is a
useful option, not least because a common experience
in patient safety improvement work is that interventions
directed against specific causes of adverse events often
result in only temporary improvement. One possible
interpretation is that adverse events have multiple
causes, and the quintessential explanation is the priority
of safety reflected in the general patient safety culture of
the unit in which the adverse events occur.
The aim of the study was to test the hypothesis that
patient safety culture is a local phenomenon, implying
that patient safety culture scores vary considerably by
hospital department and ward, and that much of the
variation is across the lowest level organizational units:
the wards.
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Methods
Study design
This study analyzes patient safety attitudes data on clini-
cal staff at Akershus University Hospital. Responses of
staff to a patient safety attitudes questionnaire were col-
lected from October to December 2006. If our hypoth-
esis was correct, we would expect to find considerable
clustering of the safety attitude scores at the department
and ward level, i.e. non-trivial-to-high intraclass correla-
tion coefficients.
The study plans were presented to the Regional Ethi-
cal Committee for Medical Research in Eastern Norway
for approval. The Committee decided the project did
not require their approval as it did not involve collecting
data on patients. The collection of data on clinical staff
was approved by the proper government authority, the
Norwegian Data Inspectorate.
Setting and participants
Akershus University Hospital is located just outside
Oslo, the capital of Norway. In 2006 the hospital had
500 somatic and 200 psychiatric beds, 4200 employees,
and an annual budget of 2.500.000.000 NOK (approxi-
mately 450 million USD). It is a general hospital with a
wide variety of specialities, but it does not include an
eye clinic and a geriatric department. In 2006 it served a
population of 280 000 inhabitants of Northeast Oslo
and the Northeastern part of the Oslo-surrounding
county of Akershus. It treated 53.000 inpatients and had
150.000 outpatient consultations. Eighty-five percent of
the inpatients were unscheduled emergency cases.
The questionnaire was distributed to all clinical staff
(physicians, registered nurses, auxiliary nurses, radiogra-
phers, laboratory technicians, midwives, and clerical
workers) at 45 somatic caregiving units - 27 wards, 14
outpatient service units, and four laboratories - of 10
clinical departments: emergency admissions, anesthesiol-
ogy, surgery, operations, orthopedics, gynecology and
obstetrics, pediatrics, internal medicine, neurology and
ear-nose-throat.
The survey
The survey instrument used was (the Norwegian transla-
tion of) the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (the SAQ)
Short Form 2006. The original (American) version of
the questionnaire is described by Sexton, Helmreich,
Neilands et al. [4]. The Norwegian version of the SAQ
has 41 questions, of which 36 reflect seven patient safety
culture dimensions: Team Climate, Safety Climate, Job
Satisfaction, Stress Recognition, Perception of Unit
Management, Perception of Hospital Management and
Work Conditions. The items which reflect each dimen-
sion are listed in Deilkås & Hofoss [5], which also
describes the development of the Norwegian version of
the SAQ and the assessment of its psychometric
properties.
Data collection
The survey was carried out at the hospital’s somatic
clinical areas during October-December 2006.
The questionnaires, which took approximately 15-20
minutes to complete, were distributed and completed at
regular staff meetings. Forms were to be completed
anonymously and did not have an ID number which
could be used to trace the responder. Employees who
did not attend the staff meeting were sent their SAQs
through the hospital’s internal mail system. As the ques-
tionnaires were anonymous, we had no way of remind-
ing non-responders, except for asking the ward and
department heads to urge their staff to participate.
Statistical analysis
To calculate the factor scores, we reversed the scores on
the negatively worded items (2 and 11). For each factor,
the mean of the item scores was calculated. One was
subtracted from each mean, and the result was multi-
plied by 25.
To partition the variation of the dimension scores by
organization level, the seven patient safety culture scores
were analyzed by MLwiN, a multilevel analysis program
developed by the University of London’s Institute of
Education [6]. The program is now being distributed
and expanded by the University of Bristol’s Centre for
Multilevel Modelling [7]. Multilevel analysis makes it
possible to partition the total variance in each dimen-
sion score into variance across individual respondents
(individual level variance), variance across wards (ward
level variance) and variance across departments (depart-
ment level variance). Analyzing the model which con-
tains only the intercept (the data set’s average patient
safety attitudes score) and no explanatory variables -
what is known as “the empty model” [8] - one can cal-
culate the percentage of the total variance in patient
safety attitudes scores that reside at the organizational
level, that is, the percentage of the variance which is not
score differences across individual responders, but
across the organizational units.
The ratio of the variance at the organizational level to
the total variance in the data is the intraclass correlation
coefficient (ICC). Multiplied by 100, the ICC can be
interpreted as the percentage of the total variance in the
data set which belongs at the organizational level, that
is, the percentage of the variance that is not differences
across individual responders, but across the organiza-
tional units. By defining the multilevel model as having
three levels - employee, ward and department - the
Deilkås and Hofoss BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:85
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/10/85
Page 2 of 5
MlwiN output showed how much the individual scores
varied around the grand mean of each dimension score,
as well as the variance in ward averages and department
averages. The null hypothesis was that there was no
clustering by organization level in the response data,
implying that there were no differences among wards or
among departments, i.e. all of the variance was across
individual responders, and no ward or department stood
out as a more promising candidate for patient safety
improvement than any other ward or department. Our
alternative hypothesis was that our data would show sig-
nificant differences across wards and across depart-
ments, implying that patient safety improvement work
should not address all departments and wards with the
same reforms, but focus on the specific problems
in units with lower scores. The results are shown in
Table 1.
The statistical significance of the variance at organiza-
tion levels was judged by the change in the goodness-of-
fit of the model to the data, as measured by the change
in the model’s log likelihood ratio produced by eliminat-
ing that level from the model. Judging significance by
the ratio of the parameter estimate to its standard error
works quite well for fixed parameters, that is, para-
meters estimated under the assumption of having the
same value in all subunits of the data set. For random
parameters, however, the distribution of this ratio may
depart considerable from normality, and a better test for
random parameters is to use the likelihood ratio statistic
[9]. In our case, the “large sample” distribution of the
-2LL-value under the null hypothesis (H0 = the two-
level model is adequate) is a c2-distribution with k2-k1
degrees of freedom - that is: d.f. = 3-2 = 1. The critical
value for p <,05 for the change in -2LL is 3,84; for
p <,01, it is 5,99. As suggested by Pinheiro & Bates (10),
this test can be conservative, producing from the c2k2-k1
distribution a p-value which is greater than it should be.
What we did, then, was to respecify our models, remov-
ing from them the idea that there was variation across
department to see how much - if at all - the respecifica-
tion damaged the three-level models’ goodness-of-fit. If
we were correct in assuming significant score variation
at all three levels, the two-level model would prove a
worse fit to the data than the three-level model. The
results are shown in Table 2.
Results
All clinical staff, a total of 1911, were asked to complete
the SAQ, and 1306 (68%) did. The response rate was
higher among nurses, auxiliary nurses, midwives, labora-
tory technicians, radiographers, physiotherapists and
other staff with less education (as compared to the phy-
sicians). Response rates were higher (98 percent) among
those who received their SAQs at staff meetings. Further
details on response rates are published in Deilkås &
Hofoss [5].
As shown in Table 1 five of the seven patient safety
dimension scores showed considerable variance at
the organizational level. Except for Stress Recognition
(ICC =,02) and Perception of Hospital Management
(ICC =,07) all dimensions had ICCs of 14 percent or
higher. The highest ICC value was for Perception of
Unit Management (21 percent) and Teamwork Climate
(19 percent). For the dimension Work Conditions, cluster-
ing was more pronounced at the department level than at
the ward level. For the dimensions of Teamwork Climate,
Safety Climate and Perception of Unit Management, clus-
tering was more pronounced at the ward level.
Table 1 Organization level variance by patient safety attitudes dimension
Dimension (all
dimensions scaled
0-100)
Total
variance
Variance at individual
level (% of total
variance)
Variance at ward
level (% of total
variance)
Variance at department
level (% of total
variance)
ICC (ratio of organizational
level variance to total
variance)
Teamwork Climate
(valid n: 1090)
285,365 231,298 (81,1%) 39,245 (13,8%) 14,822 (5,2%) 0,19
Safety Climate
(valid n: 984)
240,638 206,303 (85,7%) 21,733 (9,0%) 12,602 (5,2%) 0,14
Job Satisfaction
(valid n: 1036)
365,350 309,274 (84,7%) 28,081 (7,7%) 27,995 (7,7%) 0,15
Stress Recognition
(valid n: 1024)
491,506 483,168 (98,3%) 1,140 (0,2%) 7,198 (1,5%) 0,02
Work Conditions
(valid n: 843)
411,830 352,886 (85,7%) 20,704 (5,0%) 38,240 (9,3%) 0,14
Perception of Unit
Management
(valid n: 949)
519,785 412,491 (79,4%) 68,706 (13,2%) 38,588 (7,4%) 0,21
Perception of
Hospital
Management (valid
n: 904)
373,291 347,452 (93,1%) 12,430 (3,3%) 13,409 (3,6%) 0,07
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As shown in Table 2, for four of the seven dimensions -
Teamwork Climate, Stress Recognition, Perception of Unit
Management and Perception of Hospital Management -
the elimination of the department level from the model
did not reduce the model’s goodness-of-fit significantly, as
measured by the change in the -2LL. For the remaining
three dimensions - Safety Climate, Job Satisfaction, and
Work Conditions - the exclusion of the department level
from the model did worsen the model’s goodness-of-fit.
Discussion
Given that hospital top management wish to improve
patient safety culture, where should they intervene?
Obviously, patient safety culture scores depend on the
personal interest, attention and engagement of each staff
member. The major part of the variance in patient safety
attitudes was across individual employees, so efforts to
promote a patient safety culture must continue targeting
individual staff members. But we also found marked
clustering of patient safety culture scores at the organi-
zational levels, and much of the organization level var-
iance was across wards. In some patient safety culture
dimensions department averages differ, but in other
dimensions, wards vary more strongly than departments.
Therefore, interventions to improve patient safety
should aim not only at individual employees, but also at
organizational units, in particular those at the sharpest
end of the health services: the wards.
Having data on one hospital only, we have not been
able to check empirically the amount of clustering of
safety attitudes at the hospital level, but, as indicated by
Sexton, Helmreich, Neilands et al. [4], there probably
are hospital-specific patient safety cultures. However, as
shown by Pronovost & Sexton [11] and by Singer [12],
variability in SAQ measurements may be greater across
working groups than across hospitals. This analysis adds
to the suggestion that strategies for improving safety cli-
mate and patient safety should be tailored for work
areas and disciplines by estimating the relative size of
the variances at ward and department levels for each of
the seven safety attitudes dimensions.
As we have documented significant clustering of three
patient safety attitude dimensions at the department
level (safety climate, job satisfaction, and work condi-
tions), it should be noted that there may be differences
in patient safety culture across departments. However,
for four of the seven dimensions, there was no evidence
of variation across departments, only across wards.
Patient safety culture improvement efforts should,
therefore, include interventions at the ward level, and
not just department or all-hospital interventions. Zohar
et al. [13] has reported how information on safety cli-
mate has been used to guide prevention efforts toward
selected units. Selection must, however, be done with
discretion in order to avoid stigmatizing working units
as “low-score.” And one must not focus solely on the
low scorers: high-scoring units may also be interesting;
lessons may be learnt from their successes.
Possibly, even probably, one should in the future also
aim at studying even lower-level units, the “micro-sys-
tems” that do not appear in organizational blueprints,
but in which so much of the actual clinical work is car-
ried out [14-16]. The importance of studying such
lower-level units is obvious enough in medical depart-
ments. One may easily see patient safety as a function of
the safety culture of sub-groups of nurses or small
nurse-doctor groups within a ward. The point is particu-
larly obvious in surgical departments, where the wards
are the bed units where patients are prepared for sur-
gery and nursed after having undergone surgery, but the
work that gives the department its name - and is vital to
surgical patients’ safety - takes place in the theatres of
the department’s operating section. Studying surgical
department patient safety at the ward level, although
bedside, one might easily miss important information.
A data collection problem is that micro-systems like
operating teams are temporary groups, which do not
have permanently designated staff. This may differ
among organizations: at our hospital operation teams
are temporary, but in other organizations they may be
permanent. The inclusion of the micro-unit level into
multi-level analyses of patient safety attitudes and other
Table 2 Organization level variance by patient safety attitudes dimension
Dimension -2LL of three-level Model -2LL of two-level model
(individuals & wards)
Change in -2LL when department
level was removed from model
Teamwork Climate 9103,317 9103,477 0,163 (n.s.: p > ,05)
Safety Climate 8095,995 8101,995 5,532 (p < ,05)
Job Satisfaction 8940,755 8946,288 5,533 (p < ,05)
Stress Recognition 9245,302 9248,427 3,125 (n.s.: p > ,05)
Work Conditions 7283,521 7289,960 6,439 (p < ,01)
Perception of Unit
Management
8482,990 8484,253 1,263 (n.s.: p > ,05)
Perception of Hospital
Management
7887,215 7890,124 2,809 (n.s.: p > ,05)
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aspects of patient safety is an important task for future
patient safety research.
Conclusions
1) Patient safety culture should be studied in care-giving
units as close to the patient as possible. There may be
such a thing as “hospital safety culture,” and there are
differences across hospital departments. However,
neglecting the study of patient safety culture at the ward
level will mask important local variations.
2) Patient safety culture improvement efforts should
include interventions at ward level, not just department
or all-hospital interventions.
3) Future research should not stop at the level of hos-
pital wards, out-patient clinics, and ERs, but collect and
analyze data on the micro-systems within them: nurse
teams, doctor-nurse teams, operating teams etc.
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